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Abstract
The first decade of transition witnessed rapid and tumultuous financial sector development.
Although, few transition economies have reached the point where institutions and markets
fulfill all the functions of market based financial intermediation, progress has been much
more rapid than had been anticipated. In many countries, active market-oriented financial
institutions function where there was only a state planning mechanism a decade ago. Initial
experiences showed that bank privatization programs often failed to achieve independence
from government control and from undesirable weak clients. It is now widely accepted that
the participation of foreign strategic investors in banking is an effective way of meeting
these goals Capital market development is complicated by the need to support the deve-
lopment of institutional infrastructure and regulatory mechanisms while at the same time
avoid interfering in the markets.  In many instances policy makers expected immature
markets and institutions to accomplish unattainable goals.   Equity markets cannot be ef-
fectively support mass privatization programs.  There are still many missing pieces in vir-
tually all of the transition country capital markets.
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John Bonin and Paul Wachtel
Financial sector development in transition economies:
Lessons from the first decade
Tiivistelmä
Järjestelmämuutoksen ensimmäisen vuosikymmenen aikana siirtymätalouksien rahoitus-
sektori on muuttunut erittäin paljon ja nopeasti. Muutos on ollut odotettua nopeampi, vaik-
ka harvalla siirtymätaloudella on vielä tehokkaaseen rahoituksenvälitykseen tarvittavat
instituutiot ja markkinat. Useissa maissa rahoitusjärjestelmä perustuu kuitenkin markkinoi-
den toimintaan, kun vielä vuosikymmen sitten toimintaa ohjasi valtion suunnittelujärjes-
telmä. Järjestelmämuutoksen alussa pankkien yksityistäminen ei useinkaan johtanut todel-
liseen riippumattomuuteen hallituksesta ja heikoista asiakkaista. Nykyään uskotaan, että
ulkomaisten strategisten sijoittajien mukaantulo on erittäin tärkeää. Pääomamarkkinoiden
kehittyminen on monimutkainen prosessi, joka tarvitsee tuekseen sopivia instituutioita ja
valvontajärjestelmiä. Nämä järjestelmät eivät kuitenkaan saa estää markkinoiden toimintaa.
Usein kehittymättömiltä markkinoilta odotettiin liikaa. Massayksityistämisen kautta osa-
kemarkkinoille tuli liikaa osakkeita. Kaikkien siirtymätalouksien pääomamarkkinoilta
puuttuu edelleen useita osia.
Asiasanat:  rahoitussektorin kehitys, rahoituksenvälitys, rahoitusjärjestelmä, pääoma
                      markkinat, siirtymätaloudetBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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1  Introduction - The special characteristics of transition
Broadly speaking, the role of the financial sector in all economies is to channel resources
from primary savers to investment projects. The importance of this financial sector role has
received much attention in the recent literature on economic growth. A strong consensus
has emerged in the last decade that well-functioning financial intermediaries have a signi-
ficant impact on economic growth.
1 Modern economies have a wide range of market-
oriented institutions for facilitating this process. In planned economies, this process was
conducted by administrative arrangements and there were few market-oriented elements of
the financial sector. The only ubiquitous financial institutions in the pre-transition planned
economies were banks, which acted as recordkeepers for the planning process and payment
agents among state entities rather than as financial intermediaries. Although these banks
had the appearances of real banks, they did not function as banks would in a market-
oriented economy.
Thus, the first step in the transition process for the financial sector is the development
of market-oriented financial sector institutions. Given the unique problem faced by the
financial sectors in formerly planned economies, many observers expected that the transiti-
on process would extend over many years. In fact, many transition economies have made
remarkable process in the first decade of transition. Although financial sectors are far from
perfect, the elements of market-oriented intermediation are already the rule rather than the
exception throughout the transition world.
Although banks are the most visible and often the dominant financial sector institu-
tions, they are only one part of the process of financial intermediation. Financing arrange-
ments that allocate resources in a market economy fall along a broad and long continuum.
Financing starts with the entrepreneur, who collects the savings of friends and family, and
extends to the large firm that raises capital in a variety of ways, ranging from the issuance
of publicly traded equity to internationally syndicated loans and private placements. There
are many modes of financing and different types of institutions to facilitate these. The mo-
des can be grouped into three broad categories:
•  	
	
Entrepreneurial financing begins with the efforts of start-ups to utilize self-financing, e.g.,
the personal saving of the entrepreneurs’ friends and family. It is quite important in all
economies, including the transition economies, where large numbers of start-ups do occur.
However, the paucity of data on the financial activity of new enterprises in transition
economies makes it difficult to examine how much investment goes on and how well it is
channeled.
      In many places, efforts are made to provide some formal institutional structures for
financing start-ups. In most instances, these involve governmental efforts to assist entre-
preneurial finance, such as the Small Business Administration in the U.S. Some of the
transition economies have developed similar programs with quasi-governmental support
for entrepreneurs. For example, government-sponsored micro lending programs have been
started in several countries.  Another example is technology centers that channel physical
resources to favored scientific enterprises and help them obtain financing often with some
                                                
1 For a critical survey and evaluation of the literature on finance and growth, see Wachtel (2001).John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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form of guarantee. It should be pointed out that these efforts, in both developed and transi-
tion economies, are often government-run and not market-oriented.
Finally, trade credit provides an important source of informal interfirm financing that
is particularly valuable to small firms. In developed countries, trade credit is an important
but often overlooked source of finance. Channeled from large firms to small firms, it pro-
vides the latter with working capital and enables them to cope with financial difficulties. In
the transition economies, trade credit has a bad reputation because it often results from
interfirm arrears and soft budget constraints.
•  	

As firms grow, they turn to formal financial sector institutions for financing needs, starting
with banks. In some transition countries, bank lending to the business sector remained pri-
marily a simple extension of government soft lending to state-owned firms. Hence, the
banks accumulated large portfolios of non-performing loans and required extensive reca-
pitalization. In the more advanced transition economies, bank lending at the behest of the
government has stopped and the banking sectors in a few countries have been privatized
successfully. In these countries, bank lending to business is on commercial terms using
appropriate credit standards .
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to expect banks to do more than they can reasonably
accomplish. In some developed economies (including the U.S.), capital market financing is
as important as bank lending. Still, banks are important institutions because credit ratings
by banks and the relationships between firms and their banks are important sources of in-
formation to other credit market sources. In other countries, which follow a German bank-
oriented rather than a market-oriented approach to corporate financing, bank lending is
more important. Even in these countries, banks are often intermediating between investors
and other financial institutions. In both typologies, banks are important partly because they
work in conjunction with other financial institutions.
•  		
		
The next step in business financing is access to capital markets. Capital market activity can
start at the early stages of a firm’s development with venture capital. Initially, institutions
provide 	
	start-up capital for an entrepreneur who lacks the track record
needed for bank financing or even trade credit. As a firm develops, venture capitalists pro-
vide 

	 or 	 or 	
	that supplement any short-
term financing available to the firm.
A fully developed enterprise is likely to turn to public capital market flotations such as


	Although much of the supporting financial sector infrast-
ructure and institutions has been slow to develop in the transition economies, the more
sophisticated institutions do exist, or at least they appear to exist. In particular, extensive
equity markets are common in the transition economies.
There are some clear reasons for the rapid development of these markets. First, in
countries that relied on voucher methods, equity markets got a kick-start from the privati-
zation process. Privatization led to extensive equity ownership of firms but often the stakes
were quite small and the holdings were dispersed. Thus, all of a sudden some transition
economies found themselves with extensive equity markets.
Private sector bond markets are less well developed. The macro environment is not suffi-
ciently stable to encourage much long-term bond financing of firms. Most bond issues in
the transition economies are government debt. However, the extensive interest of assetBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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owners around the world in transition economic assets has led to the rapid development of
government bond markets in many areas.
Finally, another significant source of capital market financing for firms in some tran-
sition economies is the international capital market.  Both sovereign borrowers and the
largest firms in the transition economies have had considerable direct access to interna-
tional markets, in the form primarily of bond issuance and private equity placements. In
addition, there have been examples of firms selling equity in international markets. Access
to international capital markets facilitates the flow of portfolio investments in the transition
economies. However, at the same time, international access for just a few top companies
stifles the development of domestic capital markets because of cream skimming.
      This continuum of financing applies both to the sources of financing usually available
to a firm as it grows from a start-up to a large publicly held corporation and to the deve-
lopment and maturation of the financial sector of a developing economy. However, the
transition economies are not analogous to traditional developing countries in that their pre-
transition environment differs significantly from the environment in other emerging mar-
kets. In some, inherited industrial sectors are highly developed with companies competing
in global markets selling world-class products. Most have very uneven pockets of deve-
lopment throughout their industrial sectors. All have financial sectors that are undeveloped
compared to the level of development in the economy. At the same time, these financial
sectors have institutions with some of the characteristics of similar institutions in develo-
ped market economies. Perhaps the most important examples are the large state-owned
banks that, as a network, collect household deposits and provide financial services, e.g.,
record keeping and payment facilities, to the state-owned companies. In addition, the tran-
sition process has led to the rapid development of other institutions, particularly equity
markets that were thrust into prominence by privatization processes in many transition
countries.
The transition economies differ in size from large countries, e.g., China and Russia, to
many fairly small countries, e.g., Hungary, and to some tiny countries, e.g., Estonia and
Slovenia. The extent to which different elements of the continuum of financial sector in-
stitutions develop will depend on country size. Ultimately, small countries are unlikely to
develop the full continuum of markets and institutions. In such cases, access to foreign
capital and global financial markets will substitute for domestic institutional development.
This phenomenon is not restricted to transition or emerging markets but is characteristic of
well-developed small countries as well. Capital markets in the smaller transition countries
of Central Europe should be compared to those in developed small open economies, e.g.,
the Scandinavian countries, as opposed to the United States or Western Europe.
Nevertheless, uneven development of the real sector and the immaturity of the finan-
cial sector leave the transition economies with gaping institutional and legislative holes in
their financial spectra. In addition, evolutionary strategies have been discarded as taking
too much time given the importance of the financial sector to the modern economy. For
these reasons, any analysis of transition economies should consider both on the develop-
ment of financial institutions and on the importance of the missing pieces to the overall
functioning of the financial sector.
Our focus will be on the two parts of the financing spectrum that have received most
attention in transition economies, banks and capital markets. In section 2, we discuss ban-
king in transition by first providing a broad overview of the issues, then illustrating the
principles with country experiences, and finally concluding with lessons from these expe-
riences. Banking gets the most attention in the literature on the financial sector because ofJohn Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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its role in the payments system.
2  Section 3 uses this same framework to evaluate the de-
velopment of capital markets in transition economies. Equity markets in particular draw a
lot of attention because of their role in the privatization process. In section 4, we identify
the gaps in the institutional continuum of the financial sector. There is a paucity of infor-
mation about the elements of financial sector development that fall in the gap, such as
venture capital, money markets, institutional intermediaries and contractual savings. Ho-
wever, they can be as important as the more familiar elements of the financial sector be-
cause successful intermediation will require a broad array of institutions. Section 5 conclu-
des with policy implications for transition economies.
 It is difficult to generalize about the transition economies as a whole because of the
wide differences among them. Many of them are small open economies whose experiences
and challenges differ from those of the large relatively closed economies (e.g. China) and
the pre-transition economies (e.g. Azerbaijan). We will draw some examples from all of
these groups although much of the discussion will focus on those countries with the broa-
dest financial market experiences (i.e., Central Europe and Russia). The sections on count-
ry experiences draw most heavily on the three so-called fast track countries of Central Eu-
rope (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) and the largest countries in transition
(Russia and China). Additional examples are drawn from other regions (Baltics and South
East Europe) although there are few references to the smallest transition economies and the
pre-transition economies of Central Asia. Tables in the Appendix summarize important
financial sector indicators for the transition economies.  The tables provide a data overview
of banking and credit conditions as well as the extent of equity market development.
This article is not the first to take note of the progress that has been made in the first
decade of transition. Most of the literature focuses on specific transition problems such as
privatization and restructuring 
3 but there has been some limited attention paid to the finan-
cial sector. However, interest in the financial sector is often part of a broader interest in
macroeconomic stability and the role of monetary policy in containing inflation (see Ber-
glof and Bolton 2002 and Wagner and Iakova 2001). For more specific attention to the
financial sector see Scholtens (2000) and Hermes and Lensink (2000).
4 Although the level
of output in some transition economies is still below peak pre-transition levels, considera-
ble progress has been made. The data are subject to measurement errors that overstate the
value of pre-transition output due to the poor quality of unwanted goods and understate the
value of post-transition output in the informal economy. A more telling evaluation of the
process is the fact that the term transition is quickly becoming superfluous.  The problems
of the transition economies are increasingly the same as those faced by other countries
around the world. For example, the fiscal deficit and the capital adequacy of the banks are
problems faced by the Czech Republic and many other developing countries. The weak-
nesses of the Central Asian republics are similar to those of less-developed economies in
Africa and Asia. The travails of privatization processes and social security reform are
                                                
2 The discussion of banking draws on our earlier work; see Bonin and Wachtel (1999a and b), and
Bonin, Mizsei, Szekely and Wachtel, (1998).
3 For broad discussions of the first decade of transition see Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (1998), World Bank (2002), Blejer and Skreb (2001) and Wyplosz (2000).
4 These articles are part of a special issue of the 	
			 (Volume 24, April
2000) on research on the financial sector in transition. The topics are all on issues that are relevant
to non-transition developing and developed economies. This contrasts with an earlier 	

			 special issue (Volume 17, September 1993) on “Banks and Capital Markets
in Former Centrally Planned Countries, “which reflects the preliminary and tentative developments
in the first few years of transition.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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found all over the world.  Nevertheless, after just a decade, there are still distinct transition
problems that merit attention. However, we find it unlikely that the intensity of interest will
warrant a future survey of the first century of transition.
2  Banking in transition - Principles of efficient
             banking in transition  economies
In the planned economy, money served as a unit of account and played only a limited role
as a medium of exchange. A two-track financial system was maintained in which house-
holds used cash for transactions while transactions within the state sector, including those
between state-owned production enterprises, involved no monetary payment. The passivity
of money was supported by a banking sector in which the mono-central bank was a record-
keeping entity for transactions between production units. In most economies, specialty
banks existed separately from the central bank and performed specific functions. A state
savings bank with an extensive branch network was responsible for collecting household
deposits. A foreign trade bank handled all transactions involving foreign currency. An ag-
ricultural bank provided short-term financing to the agricultural sector. A construction
bank funded long-term capital projects and infrastructure development. Hence, banking
activities were segmented along functional lines and played a subservient role to central
planning.
Intermediation between savers and borrowers was internalized within the state ban-
king apparatus basically through a system of directed credits to state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) for both investment needs and budget allocations for working capital necessary to
meet the output plan. Credit evaluation and risk management were irrelevant; hence, these
skills were never developed domestically. Employees at the foreign trade bank and those at
the central bank involved in international financial arrangements did analyze foreign ex-
change risk but often in only at rudimentary way. In all transition economies, the first step
in banking sector reform was structural and involved the creation of a two-tier system with
commercial and retail activities carved out of the portfolio of the mono-central bank. The
new Central Bank was charged with pursuing monetary policy, including exchange rate
policy, and made responsible for the supervision and monitoring of the nascent banking
sector. The second tier consisted of the newly created commercial banks, the specialty
banks, foreign banks, and  private banks.
The three essential functions of a modern banking system are payments settlement and
record keeping, efficient intermediation between savers and investors, and the provision of
the appropriate system wide liquidity using indirect monetary policy instruments. The ar-
gument that banks are crucial to the payments system and depositories of important finan-
cial information persuaded policymakers in the more advanced transition economies to
preserve the old structure in a new form to avoid destroying informational and institutional
capital. Hence, the payments system was left in tact and banks were given the responsibi-
lity for providing financial intermediation by matching funds from savers with needs of
investors. In this process, banks are involved in various financial activities: agglomeration
of funds for large projects, selection of investment projects to be financed, monitoring the
performance and liquidity of clients, maturity conversion to provide longer-term financing
for investment in fixed capital, and the diversification, pooling and pricing of risk. TheJohn Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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extent to which banks perform these activities or leave some or most of them to financial
markets differs across countries.
In most high-income countries with developed banking sectors, the ratio of broad mo-
ney to GDP is at least 60 per cent. For example, in Eurozone countries, M3/GDP was
78.2% in 1999 (Pissarides, 2001). The banking sectors in the transition economies are not
so developed with a few exceptions. However, the highest monetization ratios are found in
the Czech and Slovak Republics where the ratios of M2 to GDP in 1999 were 75 and 65
percent respectively. The other fast track transition economies, Hungary and Poland, have
ratios of about 45 percent, as do some other countries that have successfully brought down
inflation, e.g., Croatia and Estonia.  However, the monetization ratios elsewhere, particu-
larly in the former Soviet Union, are typically about 25 percent, which is a ratio associated
with undeveloped economies. For example, in Romania the ratio of M3 to GDP in 1999
was 26 percent and in the Ukraine it was 17 percent.
5
The two pillars of an efficient banking sector are: financially strong and independent
banks with a governance structure that promotes efficient intermediation, and a regulatory
system for supervising effectively existing banks and licensing prudently new banks. The
primary objectives of the regulatory agency are maintaining the stability of the payments
system and protecting household savings. The initial conditions in transition economies
made constructing both pillars a daunting task. The newly created commercial banks were
burdened with concentrated loan portfolios, the quality of which was unknown but dubious
in a market economy. The transition generated macroeconomic turbulence and made any
new bank lending extremely risky. Initially, the banks were wholly state-owned so that the
appropriate governance structure was left to be determined in the bank privatization pro-
cess. The nascent regulatory system was based on new legislation modeled on well-
developed international standards but insufficient resources, both infrastructure and human
capital, impeded its ability to perform tasks effectively. Entry requirements for 
domestic banks were initially very lenient because policy was based on the mistaken noti-
on that competition could be promoted most easily by such entry. Instead, the proliferation
of new undercapitalized domestic banks only placed an added unwanted burden on an un-
derdeveloped regulatory structure.
Achieving the first pillar, independence both from the state via privatization and from
the legacies of the past, i.e., inherited bad loans and bad clients, turned out to be a longer
and more complicated process than anticipated for the state-owned banks. The quality of
any bank’s loan portfolio in a highly uncertain macroeconomic environment is extremely
difficult to evaluate. In transition economies, the stock of bad loans evolved partly due to
the gradual recognition of the quality of existing relationships in state-owned banks (the
stock issue) and partly due to continuing bad lending practices (the flow problem). Alt-
hough it is widely understood that bank recapitalization should be a credible one-shot oc-
currence to avoid moral hazard, this objective turned out to be difficult to achieve in all
transition economies because the true quality of the loan portfolios of the banks was re-
vealed only gradually over time.
Bank restructuring involves not only a clean up of banks’ balance sheets but, more impor-
tantly, a change in lending practice to preclude the need for continuing bailouts. In addition
to ridding themselves of past overdue loans, banks must be allowed, and encouraged, to
divest themselves of responsibility for undesirable clients to avoid making new bad loans
to them in the future. The difficulty of restructuring and the magnitude of recapitalization
                                                
5 Differences in monetization ratios among countries are strongly influenced by the development of
household credit, particularly mortgage markets. The highest ratios are found in developed
countries with consumer lending which was largely unknown in the formerly planned economies.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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slowed significantly the achievement of independent governance by privatization in state-
owned banks.
Turning to regulation, most transition economies adopted modern banking legislation
early with the expectation that effective regulation would follow. However, implementing
effective banking supervision turned out to be difficult because of a lack of trained person-
nel and supporting infrastructure. A regulatory mistake was made at the beginning of the
transition in many countries when entry of new domestic banks was the policy chosen to
promote competition. Minimum capital requirements for a bank license were set at fairly low
levels and the review process for new entrants was lax. Rather than improving the efficiency
of financial intermediation and promoting new services through competition, small weak
banks engaged in risky, and sometimes fraudulent, activities. Since banks are an integral part
of the payments system, a large number of poorly capitalized banks has negative systemic
effects that outweigh any advantages of increased competition.
The banking market in many transition economies is quite small so that only a few
domestic banks will be viable. When insolvent banks appeared to threaten systemic stabi-
lity, the authorities forced mergers and acquisitions upon larger banks. Large, state-owned
banks were “encouraged” to take over the failing smaller banks with a resulting further
weakening of their balance sheets. Given that a reduction in the number of small banks is
necessary to rationalize banking sectors after excessive entry, the wrong way to achieve
this is to force small insolvent banks on larger weak banks making the acquirers weaker
still. Small, undercapitalized banks should be allowed to fail outright as insolvent banks
did in Estonia.
6 Furthermore, when consolidation of some of the larger banks is desirable,
market-oriented policies such as tax codes that are merger-friendly are preferable to orche-
strated consolidation.
7 The basic lesson is to impose much stricter licensing conditions on
banks initially so as to screen better new entrants and not to use entry of domestic banks to
promote competition.
Effective regulation obliges the state to commit to an arms-length only relationship
with banks and to support the development of the necessary legislative infrastructure.
Preoccupation with the legacies of the past, e.g., inherited bad loans and the privatization
of state-owned banks, led to an allocation of resources focused on solving existing prob-
lems. The lack of resources available for regulatory activities kept banking supervision in
an underdeveloped state. A well-functioning regulatory system provides a high degree of
self-enforcement to preclude the need for intervention. Self-enforcing regulation is parti-
cularly important in transition economies because the human capital required for super-
vision and enforcement is scarce.
Banking is of essence a future-looking business, not a past-dependent activity. Future
returns to banking should depend on providing high-quality services and products to both
retail and commercial clients, meeting the short-term liquidity needs of profitable commer-
cial clients, and arranging long-term funding for economically rational investment projects.
In transition economies, the franchise value of banks has often been linked to short-term,
rent-seeking activities. In designing policy, regulators should pay closer attention to the
franchise value of the bank. The key to a self-enforcing regulatory system is to make the
franchise value of the banks dependent on efficient intermediation and in so doing reduce
the monitoring burden on regulators.
                                                
6 See chapter 4 of Bonin, Mizsei, Szekely and Wachtel (1998) for discussion of Estonian policy
regarding failing banks.
7 See Bonin and Leven (1996) for a supportive argument applied to the Polish case.John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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2.1  Country experiences
In this section we present country experiences for three fast-track reformers, Hungary, Po-
land, and the Czech Republic, two less-advanced reformers, Bulgaria and Romania and
two large countries, Russia and China. We also make some observations about banking in
less-developed transition countries, such as the Central Asian republics. The experiences of
fast track reformers will be used to examine the first pillar, i.e., the establishment of strong,
independent banks. As a group, these countries have had varying success on this score.
Hungary’s bank privatization policy consisted of selling controlling shares in state-owned
banks to strategic foreign investors as rapidly as possible. Such sales required an initial
recapitalization of the banks so that the combination of current net worth and franchise
value would attract a foreign investor. Due primarily to the gradual recognition of the poor
quality of loan portfolios, the Hungarian government engaged in multiple recapitalizations
of its domestic banks and earned the dubious distinction of the country most oblivious to
moral hazard. Ultimately, the Hungarian government was able to attract strategic foreign
investors and thus signal credibly the end to bailouts of these banks. By the end of 1997,
four of Hungary’s five large state-owned banks had been sold to foreign owners.
The Hungarian bank with the most exposure to loss-making industrial clients was Ma-
gyar Hitel Bank (MHB). MHB’s bad loan portfolio was put into a separate organizational
unit, a bank within a bank, in an effort to recover some of the loans. The remaining good
part of the bank was privatized with a transaction that was structured to attract a strategic
foreign investor who would increase the bank’s capital. Shortly after purchasing a 90%
stake, ABN Amro merged MHB with its own Hungarian branch subsidiary. Hence, MHB
now bears the name of the Dutch parent and is a financially sound foreign-owned bank.
MHB’s experience highlights the importance of shedding undesirable clients.
Interestingly enough, the largest Hungarian bank is now Országos Takarékpénztár és
Kereskedelmi Bank (OTP), the national savings bank. OTP was privatized in 1995 but
without a dominant foreign strategic investor (see Abel and Bonin 2000). At the time the
bank dominated the Hungarian retail market and although its market share has declined, it
is still the most important retail bank and the largest bank in the country. The privatization
of OTP was designed, because of its size and prominence, to avoid foreign domination and
foreign portfolio investors own only about one-third of the shares. The bank ownership is
diffuse and there has been continuity in management. Although competition in retail ban-
king from greenfield and foreign institutions is intense, OTP is a successful institution.
Thus, privatization of the majority of the banks in a transition country to strategic foreign
investors is likely to have spillover effects that improve the performance of the banks that
remain domestically owned.
In contrast to the Hungarian experience, the early recapitalization of the four large
state-owned Czech banks that dominated the financial sector at the time was to little avail
because soft lending practices continued even though these banks passed accumulated bad
debts to a newly created “hospital” bank. Three of the four large commercial banks partici-
pated in voucher privatization in which a minority portion of their shares was transferred to
individual investors and investment funds in exchange for privatization vouchers. These
banks participated on both sides of voucher privatization as they also sponsored the largest
investment funds. As a result, Czech banks took ownership stakes in their voucher-
privatized clients, some of which continued to be loss making, while the state retained a
controlling ownership stake in the large banks. Consequently, voucher privatization in theBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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Czech Republic strengthened the relationship between banks and clients and left bank go-
vernance held hostage to the legacies of the past.
The full extent of the bad loans problem was not recognized for several years. Esti-
mates indicate that the final cost of bank bailout in the Czech Republic may approach 30
per cent of GDP as compared to just over 10 per cent for Hungary. In 1999, classified cre-
dits reached 32 percent of the total (Dedek, 2001). Interestingly, the Czech government’s
protectionist policy had allowed domestic banks to maintain high spreads and, hence, have
the potential to be profitable. Although the banks could self-capitalize, they did not do so
because soft lending practices and poor risk assessment continued. Nor did the several
rounds of cleaning up the banks’ balance sheets strengthen the big four Czech banks be-
cause they did not achieve independence either from the state or from their unrestructured
clients.
Bank privatization in the Czech republic took place twice. As already noted, voucher
privatization in 1992 did not successfully lead to the development of a market-oriented
independent banking industry. The second round of privatization occurred from 1998 to
2000 with the sale to foreigners of majority equity interests in three large Czech banks.
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka (CSOB), the former Czech foreign trade bank, Ceska
Sporitelna (CS), the national savings bank, and Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB). Subse-
quent to its privatization to Nomura Securities, IPB became insolvent, was placed under
state receivership, and finally merged with CSOB. The Czech commercial bank, Komercni
Bank (KB), was effectively renationalized when capital injections in 2000 resulted again in
majority state ownership. In June 2001, the Czech government sold its interest in KB to
Société Générale so that all of the four major Czech banks have now been privatized and
have majority foreign owners.
The Polish experience indicates the danger in combining the resolution of bad loans
with bank responsibility for enterprise restructuring. The World Bank supported a program
of bank-led enterprise restructuring based on the notion that the major bank creditor had
sufficient information about its clients either to promote restructuring or to decide on the
winding-up of large SOEs. The main instrument used to restructure these loans was debt-
equity swaps; the weaker banks chose this option disproportionately. Hence, weak banks
with no expertise in restructuring large companies wound up taking ownership stakes in
their weak clients. Thus, bank credit was provided regularly to ailing enterprises and no
meaningful enterprise restructuring was promoted banks (Gray and Holle, 1996). Poland’s
program strengthened, rather than severed the ties between weak banks and their undesira-
ble clients and, thus, provided breathing room for ailing SOEs to postpone painful restruc-
turing (Bonin and Leven, 2001).
Poland’s efforts to establish an independent banking sector fell victim to inconsistent
policies that switched from attracting a strategic foreign investor to attempting to arrange a
large politically motivated bank merger, in which the three weakest of the commercial
banks were merged with a state savings bank to form the largest financial group in Poland.
The group’s privatization plan was delayed by the government’s desire to place some of its
shares in pension funds. In 1998, 15% of its shares were sold in a domestic IPO and, fi-
nally in 1999, a majority ownership stake was sold to Unicredito Italiano. In the first phase
of transition, changing political objectives and preoccupations with protecting domestic
banks retarded Poland’s progress in developing a banking sector independent from state
control.
The Polish banking sector entered a second phase in the late 1990s with a series of post-
privatization consolidations (see Kokoszczynski, 2000).  Foreign owners were instrumental
in promoting post-privatization mergers as a means of expansion. Five such mergers occur-
red from 1999 to 2001 and foreign owners were involved in four of these. In two of theJohn Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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four cases, the foreign bank had obtained a minority interest as part of the initial privatiza-
tion of the state-owned bank and followed up with additional share purchases prior to the
merger. For example, Allied Irish Banks purchased a minority stake in Wielkopolski Bank
Kredytowy in 1993, purchased a majority stake in this bank in 1997, and then bought an
80% stake in Bank Zachodni in 1999 when that bank was privatized. Their common fo-
reign owner merged the two banks in 2000. In the other two cases, a foreign greenfield
operation was merged with a Polish bank soon after it had been privatized, e.g., Bank Han-
dlowy and Citibank Poland merged in 2000 to form the fourth largest bank in the country.
Significant strides have been made since Poland has allowed foreign strategic investors to
take controlling interests in the large commercial banks. At the end of 1994, foreign insti-
tutions controlled only 2.1% of Polish banking assets. By 2000, 63.7% of commercial bank
assets in Poland were held by banks controlled by foreign owners.
The experiences in Hungary since 1995 and in Poland since 1999 indicate that foreign
participation in bank privatization is an effective, and perhaps inevitable, road to indepen-
dent strong banks for small and medium open bank-dominated transition countries. At the
end of 1999, foreign-controlled banks, held 68.5% of all banking assets in Hungary (Abel
and Bonin, 2000). Interestingly, EU accession was a dominant political concern that led to
the acceptance of foreign bank ownership in the Czech Republic and Poland. In embracing
this strategy earlier rather than later, Hungary developed a banking sector that is currently
far more developed, in terms of the strength and independence of its banks, than the sectors
in either of these other two countries.
Most of the other transition economies inherited banking sectors with more severe
structural distortions and more unstable macroeconomic environments than those in the
fast-track reformers. This combination is a regulatory nightmare because of the constant
threat that runs on weak banks will upset the stability of the banking sector and overwhelm
the supervisory system. Consequently, for these countries, the second pillar, effective re-
gulation, takes precedent over the first in banking reform policy.
The banking system in Bulgaria in the early transition years suffered serious structural
problems. At that time, two narrow specialty banks dominated Bulgaria’s banking sector.
Bulbank, the state-owned foreign trade bank, did not participate actively in commercial
lending, as less than one percent of its assets were loans to the non-financial sector. Der-
zhavna Spestovna Kassa (DSK), the state-owned savings bank and dominant primary de-
posit collecting institution, held mainly government securities and interbank placements as
assets. Together these two state banks constituted about half of all the banking assets in
Bulgaria. The remainder of the sector was comprised of a handful of state-owned banks,
some of which were sectoral specialty banks and some of which were created by govern-
ment-orchestrated consolidation of the original state-owned commercial banks carved out
from the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), and about three dozen  privatebanks.
Many of these private banks were licensed with less than the required amount of capital
paid in and quickly proceeded to extend loans to companies and individuals with ties to the
bank owners.
A full scale-banking crisis resulted from the macroeconomic instability and weaknes-
ses in bank governance. Asset stripping, misuses of credit, and insider lending were per-
vasive and there was little effective regulatory capability to provide oversight. In addition,
macroeconomic mismanagement resulted in hyperinflation. The overall lack of confidence
in the monetary system led to massive bank runs in mid-1996.
The regulatory response to the crisis involved a combination of bank closures, bank priva-
tization, and recapitalization. The BNB instituted bankruptcy proceedings against five
banks, including the largest private bank in Bulgaria. The third largest bank, United Bulga-
rian Bank (UBB), which is a consolidation of former commercial branches of the BNB,Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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was privatized to a consortium consisting of the EBRD, a strategic foreign investor, and
Bulbank in 1997. DSK was downsized significantly by the crisis because it held about half
of its assets in interbank placements, many of which were not repaid. The total value of
bank recapitalization in Bulgaria amounted to 35% of GDP, the highest among all transiti-
on economies. The Bulgarian experience illustrates how lethal is the mixture of mac-
roeconomic instability and structural distortions in the banking sector. The currency board
established in 1997 promoted macroeconomic stability and provided credibility for the
domestic currency. Later on the government acknowledged that bank consolidations and
strategic foreign investors were needed to develop strong independent commercial banks
and relieve the pressure on the regulatory system. In addition, there were substantial im-
provements in bank capital adequacy and supervisory oversight. The Bulgarian banks had
substantial exposure (through direct holdings and contagion effects on Bulgarian govern-
ment debt) during the Russian crisis in 1998 but were able to weather the storm.
Beginning in 1999, virtually all of the shares in two medium-sized banks, SG Express
Bank Bulgarian Post Bank, were sold to foreign owners. In 2000, two more banks, Bul-
bank and Hebrosbank, were also sold almost in their entirety each to a foreign owner. In
that year, a foreign owner purchased 90% of the shares in the previously privatized UBB.
By the end of 2000, less than 20 percent of bank assets were state owned while foreign-
controlled banks accounted for 74% of total banking assets. More than half of Bulgarian
bank assets are concentrated in three institutions including DSK, which is still state owned.
During the two years from 1999 to 2000, most of the major banks in Bulgaria were sold to
foreign majority owners with Biochim Bank, which is one of the eight sectoral banks, as
the only exception other than DSK.
More important from a long run perspective is the primitive development of banking.
Since the crisis of 1996, the banks have maintained very conservative liquid portfolios that
are concentrated in government securities and foreign currency deposits. Thus, the banking
sector has yet to develop a substantial role as a financial intermediary. This next step, i.e.,
the willingness and ability to lend to enterprises, is lacking in many other transition
economies but it is clearly an important step to take once a sound structure for bank gover-
nance has been developed. Bulgaria is poised to take this step, although despite sound ca-
pital positions and adequate liquidity at present, the risks involved with a developed len-
ding strategy could present challenges.
Romania, another relatively small open economy, also had severe structural problems
in its banking sector. From the beginning of the two-tier system in 1990 through 1998,
state-owned specialty banks and the state savings bank dominated Romanian banking. The
big five state-owned banks, Bandore, the foreign trade bank, Blanca Roman pantry Deso-









	 (CEC), the traditional
state savings bank, and Banca Commerciala Romana (BCR), created from the commercial
assets of the National Bank of Romania in 1990, held 73% of banking assets at the end of
1995. Bank lending to state enterprises without serious credit standards was common and
soon a large portion of commercial bank loans were non-performing. By the middle of the
decade, both Bancorex and Banca Agricola were in serious financial distress due to their
accumulated bad debts from directed credits to the energy and agricultural sectors, respec-
tively. The full nature of their problems became apparent in 1997. By the end of 1998 and
after significant devaluation of the currency, bad loans accounted for about 80% of Banco-
rex’s credit portfolio. There was a run on Bancorex, in 1998 during which $200 million left
the banking system (	
February 1999, p.30). Faced with the serio-
us threat of a systemic banking crisis at the beginning of 1999, the authorities adopted a
restructuring strategy that included setting up a hospital bank to take over the bad debtsJohn Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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from Bancorex and Banca Agricola. The strategy involved closing Bancorex and restructu-
ring Banca Agricola by transferring its bad assets to the hospital bank in exchange for go-
vernment securities to prepare the bank for privatization. Bancorex’s healthy assets were
absorbed by BCR and Bank Agricola was sold in 2001.
The Czech experience indicates that hospital banks cannot solve the bad loan problem
alone. Rather, the lending behavior of banks must be modified to prevent its recurrence.
For Romania, this meant changing the behavior of the large insolvent state-owned banks
that held half of all bank loans. Bancorex’s assets and liabilities were transferred to BCR,
which became the largest bank in the country accounting for almost one third of all bank
assets. The cost to the government of the Bancorex closure was about $1.5 billion (4.5 per-
cent of GDP) in 1999. In addition the unsuccessful recapitalization of the bank in 1997 and
subsequent liabilities from the takeover by BCR added almost another billion dollars (In-
ternational Monetary Fund, 2001). With the closure of Bancorex and the subsequent priva-
tization to foreign owners of BRD and Banc Post, foreign banks held 49.6% of all banking
assets and 47.4% were held by state-owned banks by the end of the decade.
Although the Romanian banking system is in much better shape now than in the recent
past, it still faces major problems that are common in the transition countries. Banking as-
sets are split virtually in half with one part held by foreigners and the other half still state-
owned. At the beginning of 2002, three large banks together held 55.5% of all bank assets in
Romania. Two of the three, BCR with a dominant 31% share of total assets and CEC with an
8.6% share, are still state owned and their privatization will not be easy. There are plans to
privatize BCR by 2003 but CEC will not be ready for privatization for some time. The re-
mainder of the industry consists of a large number of small private banks, including the ra-
pidly growing greenfield operations of ABN Amro, ING and Citibank, and some smaller
formerly state-owned banks. Without minimizing the importance of sound balance sheets
and appropriate regulatory oversight, these do not imply that banks are effectively serving
the economy. A fully developed banking sector will be intermediating household savings
to private sector investment activity as well as providing money services. The degree of
intermediation in Romania is small; the ratio of bank credit to GDP at about 17% in 1999
is low compared to other transition economies. Furthermore, the banks themselves tend to
hold government debt and have not yet developed the ability to evaluate and monitor bu-
sinesses loans.
Both of these problems, i.e., the remaining privatization of large dominant banks and
the development of effective financial intermediation, are common to other transitions
economies.  The large relatively closed transition economies, e.g., China and Russia, have
more scope for institutional choice in dealing with these issues because they have fewer
external constraints.  On the other hand, relatively protected domestic financial sectors in
large countries allow policymakers to delay the development of efficient banking sectors.
Prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, bank deposits (mostly household deposits)
and loans to enterprises were each about one-half of GDP. The dissolution of the union
caused problems for monetary policy and payments settlements. Russia experienced disin-
termediation following a bout of hyperinflation; household deposits as a ratio of GDP fell
to 2% and enterprise loans to GDP fell to 11% by 1993. Regulatory problems were also
severe in Russia and new entrants were largely unsupervised. By the middle of the 1990s,
over 2,600 banks existed in Russia and about two-thirds of these were  private
banks. Furthermore, the franchise value of the major Russian banks was linked to rent-
seeking rather than efficient intermediation. Since the vouchers used in the mass privatiza-
tion scheme were transferable in Russia, banks profited from transactions in vouchers in
the early period of transition. Later on, banks earned significant rents on foreign exchange
transactions.  When these opportunities were no longer available, large Russian banksBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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found two new sources of rent, namely, purchasing high-yield government short-term se-
curities (GKOs) and participating in the loans-for-shares privatization scheme.
Before the financial crisis in 1998, the overall structure of the banking sector was not
particularly different from other transition economies. The ten largest banks accounted for
about half of banking sector assets; however, six of these were  private banks, a
characteristic that distinguishes the Russian experience from the fast track countries. Sber-
bank, the state-owned, Central-Bank-controlled savings bank, is the largest Russian bank
by far with about a quarter of total banking assets and over 50,000 branches. Sberbank was
essentially a narrow savings bank holding about three-quarters of the retail deposits in
Russia and having explicit full deposit insurance with state guarantees. On the asset side,
Sberbank held mostly government debt (GKOs). The next largest bank was the state-
owned foreign trade bank with a little over 5% market share and the shares of the next lar-
gest banks ranged from 2% to less than 4%.
However, the financial sector in Russia was developing characteristics that were sub-
stantially different from other transition economies. Among the top ten banks were the lead
banks in six of the “Big 7” financial-industrial groups (FIGs) including the high profile
banks, Inkombank, Menatep, and Uneximbank. To the extent that these lead banks provi-
ded financing for the commercial members of their FIGs, a significant portion of bank
loans to large companies was internalized within the groups. Hence, before the financial
crisis, the Russian capital market was taking on characteristics of an Asian model in which
large financial groups, each containing a lead bank, dominate the market. This illustrates
the broader scope for institutional development in a large relatively closed transition
economy but it does not establish the outcome as a conscious policy decision. Rather the
Russian experience illustrates the ability of rent-seeking entrepreneurs to take strong mar-
ket oligarchic positions in a loosely regulated and rapidly evolving financial sector.
In 1998, the Russian government defaulted on its domestic debt obligations and the
country entered a prolonged financial crisis that affected severely the larger  banks.
Many of the large Moscow banks that dominated the industry collapsed and at least two
important institutions, Uneximbank and Menatep entered bankruptcy proceedings. The
number of banks declined by more than 10% in the year after the crisis and 15 of the 18
largest banks were insolvent (EBRD, 	 !!!p. 259). Sberbank, the only
Russian bank with a one hundred percent government guarantee on deposits, survived the
crisis and was one of the few Russian banks extending commercial loans in the aftermath
of the crisis (	
, March 1999, p.29). Smaller  private banks
that had lost out to the rent-seeking entrepreneurs, who established the FIGs before the
crisis, are now competing for market share. Appropriate legislation for dealing with the
crisis did not exist at the time and the regulatory responses were entirely inadequate. There
were some legislative changes in 1999 but the new legal framework has not been widely
utilized. Nevertheless, there has been a remarkable recovery in the banking sector. Parado-
xically, the banking sector has grown since the 1998 crisis despite limited changes in the
overall financial environment (see OECD 2002, pp. 52-62).
A bank-restructuring agency was established in 1999 but it has not been particularly
active because it has limited resources. The central bank has been able to close many small
problem banks although capital adequacy rules are often applied very loosely. Neverthe-
less, by 2001, the banking sector more or less reached its pre-crisis size. Bank assets to
GDP are almost at the 1998 level; commercial credit to the non-financial sector as percent
of GDP is at the 1998 level; bank capital continues to grow and arrears declined.
Thus, the aggregate data could be used to tell a very optimistic story of a private sec-
tor banking system that successfully reacted to crisis. However that story would be an
exaggeration. Much of the recent growth in banking comes from profitable and growingJohn Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
Lessons from the first decade
20
industrial firms with a particular business connection to a bank. The degree of monetizati-
on in the economy is still rather small. Overall, there is still a lack of trust in banks and a
very weak legal environment for pursing claims of any kind. Moreover, real interest rates
remain negative.
In addition, the state owned saving bank, Sberbank, is still the dominant institution
with 23.5 percent of all commercial bank assets, 31.2% of all credits to the non-financial
sector and 75.2% of household deposits at the beginning of 2001. Sberbank has begun to
move its asset portfolio from government securities to private sector credits. Even the state
owned savings bank is evolving into a commercial bank for the business sector. For many
regional banks administration of the Federal and local budgets continue to be their major
activity.
Although, there has been progress in the banking sector, substantial risks still exist.
The weakness of the regulatory structure and low capital levels are the most important. In
addition, the legal framework to provide protection to creditors claims is still undeveloped.
The development of better banking regulation and supervision is a clear priority in Russia.
The financial crisis provided the government with an opportunity to dismantle the wea-
kened FIGs and develop a strategy for the evolution of the financial system but it has not
been seized. As the banking sector grows beyond its 1998 levels the same underlying
problems might arise. The experience in Russia echoes those in the Czech Republic with
voucher privatization; it is extremely difficult to unravel non-transparent relationships bet-
ween banks and clients.
China, also a large, relatively closed economy, has a deeper, more bank-dominated fi-
nancial sector than any transition economy. Over two decades beginning in 1978, the ratio
of household deposits to GDP rose from 6% to 57% and the ratio of bank loans to GDP
grew from 50% to 90%. Four large state-owned specialty banks dominated the financial
sector. Unlike other transition economies, China did not have a separate state savings bank
network so that these same four banks collect more than three-quarters of the household
deposits. The four banks took financial responsibility for government policy including the
support of loss-making SOEs, which constituted about half of all SOEs by the end of the
period. Banking regulation is in an embryonic stage in China and standard international
loan classifications were only imposed on all the banks in the late 1990s. At that time, the
central bank reported that 20% of the loans in the big four banks were non-performing
while foreign estimates indicated that at least 25% of their loan books must be written off
entirely (Bonin and Huang, 2001). If the latter estimate is correct, about $190 billion or
22.5% of GDP must be subtracted from the assets of these four banks.
In an attempt to deal with the bad loan problem, the government created an asset ma-
nagement company to which bad loans are transferred and worked out or sold in packages.
The experiences in Poland and Hungary indicate that secondary markets for bad debt are
extremely thin and that recovery rates are consequently low on this type of asset. More-
over, the Czech experience with its hospital bank indicates that moving loans does not stop
the flow of new bad loans in banks. The Chinese experiment does not separate undesirable
clients from their banks so that soft lending practices are likely to continue because the
large banks are not yet independent from government directives.
In recent years, there has been some progress in addressing the banking sector prob-
lems in China. The state commercial banks have been recapitalized and non-performing
loans have been shifted to the asset management company.  The recapitalization in 1998
amounted to 3½ percent of GDP and was followed in 1999 and 2000 by the transfer of
non-performing loans totaling 15½ percent of GDP. There have been some efforts at assets
sales and debt equity swaps. Despite these positive developments, the banking situation
remains problematic as the state-owned banks often continue to accumulate loans to state-Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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owned enterprises. New estimates of non-performing loans in the four large banks that
account for three-quarters of bank assets show improvement although they are still large.
Estimates by Citigroup place non-performing loans at 41% in 1998 and 28% at the start of
2001. Capital asset ratios in these banks averaged 6.6% at the start of 2001. The underlying
reform of enterprise ownership and management is progressing slowly but perhaps not
quickly enough to avoid a banking crisis. In addition, China is one of the last transition
countries to limit foreign bank activities and restrict foreign ownership of Chinese banks.
Recent accession into the WTO establishes a timetable for opening the Chinese banking
sector to foreign financial institutions but the impact of this move is likely to be minimal in
the near future due to the dominance of the large four banks (Bonin and Huang, forthco-
ming).
China’s closed financial sector has allowed the government to use these large banks to
fund projects that should have been financed transparently from fiscal revenues. Unlike in
the other Asian economies, the structural deficiencies of the Chinese banking system have
not been exposed by an externally driven financial crisis. However, the further develop-
ment of capital markets in China is impeded because it would provide attractive financial
instruments and encourage households to withdraw deposits from insolvent banks. China
should pursue more aggressively banking reforms that would support institutional deve-
lopment. In this way, the government could promote, not retard, broad institutional deve-
lopment in the financial sector and, at the same time, allow the state-owned banks to be-
come independent from both the state and their undesirable clients. Although, the private
sector in China has developed rapidly, private firms rely more on internal financing and
stock issuance and less on banks than is the case in other transitions or developed
economies (Gregory and Tenev, 2001).
The least-developed transition economies are the Central Asian republics. With the
break up of the Soviet Union, these countries faced the daunting task of establishing an
independent monetary system and creating banking organizations. The state-owned banks
that were the successors to Soviet era institutions continued to operate as arms of the go-
vernment. As could be anticipated, they accumulated large portfolios of bad loans and
quickly required recapitalization and restructuring.  In addition, bank regulation barely
existed so there was wide proliferation of small private inadequately capitalized banks.
Desperately weak financial systems emerged almost immediately after the transition star-
ted.
The initial institutions of bank regulation were efforts to respond to problem banks. In
1995, the new bank regulators in Kazakhstan liquidated 60 banks, which brought the total
down to 130. In the Kyrgyz Republic in 1996, two large state-owned banks were liquida-
ted. The Kyrgyz banks were exposed in the Russian banking crisis and, in 1998 authorities
closed three banks that controlled almost 45 percent of total bank assets. Thus, the Central
Asian republics experienced severe banking crises and embarked on costly restructuring
programs.
Public confidence in the banking system continues to be very weak; credit to GDP ra-
tios have declined; currency to deposit ratios are very high and the M2/GDP ratios are in
the teens. Although there have been efforts to respond to the banking crises, progress has
been very limited. Non-performing loans continue to grow. Although some banks have
been privatized, there are still too many small and inadequately capitalized institutions. In
sum, the banking sector in these countries is doing very little in the way of providing in-
termediary services. The banking sectors are both a reflection of and a cause of severe
post-transition declines in output. Nevertheless, there are some signs of improvement in
both the real and financial sectors. Real GDP per capita in Kazakhstan and KyrgyzstanJohn Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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increased in 2000 for the first time in almost a decade and banking sector assets began to
grow in 2001 in both countries.
2.2  Lessons for the banking sector
After selling controlling stakes to strategic foreign owners shortly after the final round of
bank recapitalization, Hungary was the first of the transition countries to develop a strong
and independent banking system. The other fast-track countries started with somewhat
different and less successful strategies before they adopted the approach used in Hungary.
By a privatization strategy that maintained the links between banks and clients and did not
promote a transfer of control from the state, the Czech Republic perpetuated the problems
of a state owned banking system. Poland had a mixed experience in the early years of tran-
sition; its major successes occurred with banks that were sold to foreign owners and with
mergers that were market-based. Poland’s initial failures are attributable to a government-
orchestrated consolidation policy and to an integrated restructuring program that encoura-
ged weak banks to continue to support their weak clients. However, after a series of mer-
gers and sales to foreign investors, the Polish banking system is now largely independent
and strong. The Czech Republic has now completed a second round of privatizations in
which all major banks have been sold to majority foreign owners. This should allow Czech
banking to catch up rapidly with the others two countries’ banking sectors.
 The primary lesson from these experiences is the importance of severing the links
between banks and weak clients. For small, open countries, Hungary’s experience indicates
that foreign participation in bank privatization is an effective, and perhaps inevitable, road
to independent strong banks. Hungary was the first to learn the lesson, Poland caught on
after some bad initial experiences and the Czech Republic has finally moved in that direc-
tion. In embracing this strategy earlier rather than later, Hungary has developed a banking
sector that is ahead of those in the other two countries in terms of the strength and inde-
pendence of its banks.
Another lesson is the importance of a market for the control of banking institutions.
Equity issuance to dispersed owners does not accomplish this but mergers, consolidations
and investments by strategic investors will create such a market. Once it exists, there can
be competition even in small highly concentrated markets.
The experiences of less-advanced reformers indicate the importance of developing the
regulatory structure, especially in unstable macroeconomic environments, for the banking
sector. Hyperinflation leads to disintermediation and a significant shrinkage of the moneta-
ry base of the economy. Macroeconomic stability and strong bank supervision are necessa-
ry conditions to rebuilding the banking sectors of these countries. The experience of tran-
sition economies, large and small, fast track or not, indicates that the entry of many under-
capitalized  private banks fosters systemic instability. For small open countries,
foreign participation in domestic banking is a much more effective means of promoting
both competition and development of the sector. However, stability is a necessary conditi-
on for sufficient foreign entry and strong regulation is a necessary condition for effective
supervision once foreign participation occurs. In all transition economies, effective regula-
tion requires resources and know-how to complement legislation.
The large, closed transition economies have more flexibility in designing efficient banking
sectors. These countries can allow the banking sectors to develop according to either Ang-
lo-Saxon or German models and they have the opportunity to allow their domestic banking
sectors to evolve gradually and without significant foreign participation. However, CentralBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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European economies, such as Bulgaria or Romania, do not the luxury of gradual evolution.
They are in a great hurry to reform their banking systems as quickly as possible to meet the
overriding objective to join the European Union. This goal requires the development of a
regulatory system that complies with EU guidelines and the opening of the domestic ban-
king sector to foreign competition. Nonetheless, the large and somewhat closed economies
can learn from the experiences of these countries.  Although Russia and China have the
ability to proceed more slowly and independently, this path is not without costs. The Rus-
sian banking sector suffered the same fate as the banking sectors in the fast-track countries
due to excessive and improperly supervised entry.  China’s program for dealing with bad
loans is destined to encounter many of the problems faced in the Czech Republic and, thus,
it may allow soft lending to continue. In summary, the large countries seem to be repeating
the mistakes of the fast-track transition economies rather than learning the appropriate les-
sons from banking sector development in these countries.
In the Central Asian Republics, as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the mistakes
of the early transition years were very costly. Misguided credit expansion as an extension
of the government budget and the emergence of new undercapitalized private banks crea-
ted problems at a much faster pace than the increase in these countries’ abilities to create
institutional frameworks for a sound financial system. The banking crises in the late 1990s
gave pause and allowed institution building to begin. Moreover, some lessons were learned
from the experiences of the fast track reformers and foreign participation in banking is of-
ten encouraged. However, it is not at all clear that a sufficiently sound set of institutions is
in place to support the financial sector required for growth.
3  Capital markets in transition
The term capital market refers to both bond and equity markets where the latter includes
the debt issues of both private and public sector entities. The most fully developed segment
of capital markets in transition economies is the equity market where developments have
usually been pushed along by privatization. Public sector bond markets are also quite
common because government deficits lead to debt issuance and efforts have been made to
develop secondary markets in order to encourage inter-bank money markets and to enable
the central bank to conduct open market operations for monetary policy. Private sector
bond issues are few and far between and are discussed in more detail in the next section of
the paper that is devoted to ‘missing pieces’ in the financial sector.
3.1  Equity markets in transition economies
One of the most dramatic symbols of the transition process has been appearance of stock
markets in formerly planned economies. The advent of a stock market – the most potent
symbol of capitalism – in Central Europe was a dramatic indication of the enormous chan-
ges that came with the transition (see Mendelson and Peake, 1993, for an early discussion).John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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By 1999, 20 (out of 26) transition countries had equity markets, albeit with varying degrees
of activity.
8
A common measure of the extent of equity market development is the ratio of market
capitalization to GDP. It is highest in those countries where the privatization process has
gone the furthest. In 1997, the largest capitalization ratio among transition economies was
in Hungary with 33 percent and Croatia and the Czech Republic were the only other count-
ries above 20 percent. By 2000, capitalization ratios in Estonia and Hungary were in the
mid 30s and Poland and the Czech Republic were above 20 percent.  Capitalization ratios
had been over 30 percent in the Czech Republic and about 25 percent in Russia before
stock prices declined. In the other transition economies, market capitalization is just a
small fraction of GDP (which itself is depressed).
9
The EBRD 	 !!" provides comparisons of stock market develop-
ment in the transition countries with the rest of the world. To begin, market capitalization
as a percent of GDP rises with per capita GDP.  The capitalization ratio in the Czech Re-
public peaked at 33 percent in 1996, but the EBRD study suggests that in a typical country
with the same per capita output, the capitalization ratio would exceed 50 percent.  In the
other transition countries with large equity markets, the capitalization ratios are rarely over
20 percent, while capitalization ratios in countries with similar levels of output are 20-40
percent. Moreover, privatization processes that resulted in capitalization ratios that ap-
proach developed country levels in a few countries may be a misleading indicator of the
maturity of equity markets. Transition economy equity markets may appear large but illi-
quidity and lack of transparency in trading limit the effectiveness of the markets.
 Turnover ratios – the ratio of value traded to capitalization – are small in most of the
transition economies with some notable exceptions.  In 1999, the ratio was 103 percent in
Hungary where it had increased rapidly from 17 percent in 1995. It was around 60 percent
in 1999 in the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania. There have been episodes of high
turnover rates for short periods in some smaller transition stock markets. For most of the
transition economies, turnover has been very small, often less than 15 percent. The mean
among the twenty countries with stock markets in 1999 was 32 percent. In wealthy develo-
ped economies turnover ratios average a bit over 50 percent. In emerging markets, there is
wide variation in turnover ratios (see IMF, #		
 		
 $	 Sept. 1998,
p.33) but around 40 percent is typical.
 Another measure of overall stock market development is the number of listed com-
panies although these counts can be very misleading for transition economies. The total
number of companies listed on transition stock exchanges was 3372 in 1997 and 8748 in
1999. By comparison, in the United States there are fewer than 10000 firms listed on the
three national exchanges and only about 3000 on the New York Stock Exchange. Mass
privatization programs in some transition economies led to immediate diffuse ownership
and mass listings of often very small and hardly traded equities. As a result there were al-
most 1700 listings in the Czech Republic in 1995. However, there was little trading in most
of these companies; fewer than half traded daily and many small firms were delisted. The
                                                
8 Data on equity markets in the transition economies can be found in the Appendices to Claessens,
Djankov and Klingbiel (2000) and in the International Finance Corporation’s $	
	
9 In other countries around the world capitalization ratios vary with stock prices and market
structure. In the U.S. it doubled in the market expansion of the 90s to a peak of about 150%. In the
UK, it is above 100% while in Germany, with a different structure of corporate ownership, it is
under 50%. In many emerging market countries it is usually ranges between 30 and 70 percent of
GDP.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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number of listed companies declined to less than 200 in four years. Similarly privatization
in Romania led to over 5000 new listings in 1998.
The market capitalization of individual firms is often very small in transition count-
ries, much smaller than we might associate with liquid secondary markets in developed
countries. Even the average firm capitalization is very small in most countries. Market ca-
pitalization is often dominated by just a handful of large companies.
It is time to ask whether equity markets in the transition economies are anything more
than a symbol. Do they enhance the liquidity of capital in any significant way? Do they
provide a significant mechanism for driving capital to its most efficient uses? In other
words, are the nascent equity markets in the transition economies doing what equity mar-
kets are supposed to do?
Equity markets come into existence in developed countries as firms grow in size.
First, over time the ownership of firms tends to become more diffuse as ownership passes
from a single entrepreneur to heirs and additional investors. Second, firms begin to turn to
equity or bond flotation as a means of raising funds. Finally, stock markets develop since
such securities are always more attractive when there are opportunities to trade them. Ho-
wever, the sudden emergence of stock markets in most of the transition economies is rela-
ted to an entirely different phenomenon – the privatization process.  Mass privatization
placed ownership of shares in the hands of large numbers of citizens very quickly. The
stock markets were opened to provide some means of allocating and trading the ownership
rights that came with privatization.
In Bulgaria, Romania, the Slovak Republic the Czech Republic and a few smaller
countries the stock market grew suddenly because of mandatory mass listing following
mass privatization programs. As expected there were a large number of illiquid issues.  In
Poland, Hungary and some other countries, listings followed a more traditional IPO pro-
cess; they were smaller in number and more likely to have some trading activity.
There were two problems with the explosion of stock markets in the transition
economies. First, it was unrealistic to expect the stock markets to provide liquidity and
access to capital for so many firms. Even in those countries with larger markets, both ca-
pitalization and trading activity are concentrated among a handful of large companies.
Thus, public stock ownership for many firms did little or nothing to increase their access to
capital or provide a means of corporate control. Second, the stock markets leaped into
existence before the institutional infrastructure for markets had come into existence. Thus,
equity listings are not a guarantee of transparent share registration, the ability to transfer
ownership or the absence of manipulation of prices. They do not imply any minimum stan-
dards of financial disclosure by firms nor do they promote competitive activity or provide a
means for shifting corporate control.
To the extent that there have been IPOs, they have been orchestrated by the govern-
ment as part of a privatization process.  That is not to say that the role of stock markets in
the privatization process has not been useful. In countries where mass privatization did not
occur, the stock markets have been used to raise privatization revenues and spread control
especially as the state rids itself of residual ownership shares of large companies.
For public equity markets to fulfill their primary economic functions, i.e., pricing ca-
pital, facilitating corporate governance, trading must be sufficient to provide liquidity to
the share holder and enough ownership interest to make the equity market a source of mar-
ket discipline and oversight over management. These requirements restrict the size and
number of companies that are listed on equity markets. The fewer than 10,000 listed com-
panies on the three national exchanges in the U.S. are not a relevant comparison. It is better
to compare the transition economies with equity markets in other developing economies.
For example, Greece has an active equity sector with 230 listed companies, a market capi-John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
Lessons from the first decade
26
talization equal to over 20 percent of GDP and an average capitalization of the listed com-
panies of $107 million. Equity market trading can be expected only in a handful of relati-
vely large companies that will attract investor interest and scrutiny from domestic and fo-
reign analysts.
Foreign investment in equities in the transition economies was modest until 1995.
After that, the transition economies with stock markets were caught up in the general inter-
est in emerging stock markets. The stock markets in the advanced transition economies
were included in various emerging market stock indexes that generally facilitated market
interest. Stocks in the transition economies surged in the following years as capital inflows
pushed up prices until the collapse following the Russian crisis. In Poland, Czech Repub-
lic, Russia and, particularly Hungary, foreign stock holding accounts for substantial shares
of the total. Over one-half of the total capitalization of the Hungarian market is foreign
owned. These four countries (along with Slovakia) are included in the IFC investable
country indices. It was estimated that foreign investors accounted for about one-fifth of
exchange trading in 1995 and at the start of 1998 foreigners owned 38 percent of all Polish
equities (		
27 October 1998).
The more advanced transition economies have a handful of companies that might be
of sufficient size and development to play a role on international equity markets. Some
large and successful privatizations led to companies having access to international capital
markets. In some instances, the stocks are listed on Western exchanges through depository
receipts.
10  Hungary was the first issuer and Russia followed suit in 1995. There were pla-
cements in 1996 by the major Russian energy companies, Gazprom and Lukoil. By 1999
there were 12 Russian ADRs (American depository receipts) including 3 with NYSE lis-
tings.  In addition, at least 6 Russian companies have depository receipts issued in Russia
(RDCs) for trading in Europe. Seven of the ten largest Russian companies are listed abro-
ad. Almost $1 billion in Russian depository receipts have been issued, mostly in 1996 and
little since then. A similar amount of receipts for the shares of Hungarian companies have
been issued. Also, at least four large Czech companies are listed as GDRs (Global de-
pository receipts) in London. The market capitalization of companies listed abroad is two-
thirds as large as domestic market capitalization in Kazakhstan due to the international
popularity of energy companies; the average for all the transition economies is less than 20
percent. By the end of 1999, 72 companies from the transition economies had ADRs traded
on American markets and 61 transition country companies traded in London.
The issuance of depository receipts by companies in transition economies has advan-
tages and disadvantages. On one hand, it is a clear signal of the maturity of capital markets
since companies usually have to satisfy some accounting and disclosure requirements to
gain listings abroad. It is also an indicator of the attractiveness of these companies. Notab-
ly, Russian companies were able to use depository receipts to access international capital
markets even when Russian corporate governance and disclosure standards lagged Western
standards. On the other hand, increased use of depository receipts might inhibit the deve-
lopment of local equity markets. If the large and strongest companies rely on international
equity markets, then the local market is restricted to small and illiquid issues. If trading in
large companies moves abroad, there is less liquidity on domestic exchanges, which will
reduce the interest of foreign investors.
The conflict between international stock markets and domestic exchanges is not just a
transition economy problem. As trading interest in the largest and most successful firms
concentrates on a few global stock exchanges, domestic equity markets in all but the lar-
                                                
10 In order to facilitate equity trading in major financial markets, it is common to place shares in
trust and for the trustee to issue depository receipts that are traded on major financial marketsBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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gest emerging markets and in many small developed countries might become less viable.
Market consolidation may inhibit the role that stock markets can play in the development
process.
The domestic stock markets in the transition companies provide an additional function
for foreign investors in these economies. They provide liquidity for foreign investors in
these countries. An equity market investment is more liquid than direct foreign invest-
ments. However, the 1997 Asian crisis and the 1998 Russian crisis, demonstrated that there
are also risks involved in emerging market stock market investments. These investments
can be very volatile, are subject to exchange risk and contagion spreads market crises
quickly among the markets. Thus, the verdict is unclear on whether emerging stock mar-
kets will lead to permanent increases in investor interest.
Claessens, Djankov and Klingbiel (2000) examined the determinants of capitalization
and turnover in the transition economies with a regression model. They forecast that mac-
roeconomic stability and improvements in shareholder rights might lead to some growth in
equity markets in the transition economies that have been slow to reform (such as Romania
and Central Asia). In the faster reformers, the growth of institutional investors might lead
to some modest increases in capitalization ratios. Generally, stock markets are likely to be
making a modest contribution to financial market development. The only exceptions might
be in large countries such as Russia or China where significant structural reforms and im-
provements in corporate governance could lead to equity markets that are important parts
of the intermediation process.
In the next section, we review stock market development in the three fast track refor-
mers – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – and the two large countries – Russia
and China.  Stock markets in the other transition countries are either too small or too unde-
veloped to play any role in financial sector development as yet.
3.2  Country experiences: Equity markets
The Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) first opened in 1817 but it was closed under the
communist regime. Equity markets returned to Poland in April 1991with the reopening of
the exchange and the establishment of a regulatory body, the Polish Securities Commissi-
on, later in the year. Both the number of companies listed and market capitalization have
increased steadily as the number of completed privatizations has increased. The mixed
approach to privatization in Poland implies that there has not been any massive increase in
the number of listings on the WSE. As a result, the stock market institutions have been able
to grow gradually and provide adequate liquidity for new listings
The privatized banks are an important part of equity market activity. Several of them
were privatized with IPOs and as a result, four of the ten largest companies on the WSE at
the end of 1995 were banks. The mass privatization program distributed vouchers that can
be converted to ownership of one of the fifteen investment funds that are traded on the ex-
change. More importantly, the privatization of firms in Poland is still underway through
various combinations of IPOs and the block sale of shares. In most instances there is a
strategic investor that is often foreign. As a result the number of WSE companies with lar-
ge market capitalization has increased and the number of listings exceeds 200. Although
trading activity has increased many of the larger privatized companies are closely held by
the strategic investors or residual state ownership. As a result, much of the equity is not
available for trading (typically less than 30 percent) which limits market liquidity.John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
Lessons from the first decade
28
The largest company privatized was the telecom company that started with a sale of
15 percent of the company in November 1998 in an IPO that valued the company at $6.2
billion. Further block sales led to an ownership structure that gave about one-third to a
strategic investor, one-third retained by the state and the rest split among employees and
institutional investors.
Trading in Warsaw is computerized in a system that provides equal access to all parti-
cipants and is designed to maximize liquidity and trading activity. Orders are collected in
advance and a daily computer run call auction determines a single price. At the end of
1998 there were 1.2 million investment accounts at Polish brokerage houses.  The stock
exchange is also participating in efforts to strengthen corporate governance and increase
shareholder, particularly domestic institutions, activism.
Although the Polish stock market has made remarkable strides, it still plays a limited
role as a financial intermediary. There have been very few mergers and acquisitions using
the stock market, only a handful of secondary market IPOs and few instances of share issu-
ance as a source of funds.
The development of the equity market in the Czech Republic is related to the mass
privatization program that started in 1990 and led to the privatization of most large enter-
prises in two waves of voucher privatization in 1992-94. A drawback of mass privatization
is that it usually leads to very diffuse ownership of shares that enables the existing mana-
gement to retain control of enterprises. Entrenched management may be unwilling or una-
ble to work in the best interests of the shareholders. One of the motivations for the estab-
lishment of investment privatization funds (IPFs) in the Czech Republic was to create sig-
nificant ownership influence over the corporation that would push the firms to restructure.
The IPFs did not evolve, as anticipated, into mutual funds that would provide oversight and
discipline of corporate management.
Despite limits on IPF holdings of any particular company, they dominate corporate
control in many instances and are often closely connected to entrenched management. The
influence of the funds was reinforced by the fact that most of them were created by and
continue to be controlled by banks that are also the source of corporate financing. The IPFs
and their bank owners became an entrenched management structure that chose to continue
traditional business relationships rather than promote any radical restructuring that would
endanger their positions or control of firms. The situation has not generated improvements
in corporate governance nor has it led to as rapid restructuring of industry as had been anti-
cipated. The Czech Republic was widely viewed as the star among transition economies,
where voucher privatization, investment funds and equity trading would quickly modernize
the economy. These widely held expectations have been largely unrealized.
Although, the Czech Republic has a relatively high level of stock market capitalizati-
on to GDP and a large number of publicly traded companies, the market was characterized
by a lack of transparency in trading and very little trading in many issues.  Equity markets
have not improved the transparency of corporate governance nor provided a vehicle for
raising additional equity capital.
A complex trading mechanism that allows shares to be traded in more than one way
(for a description see OECD %&'
 !!() was prone to ma-
nipulation of share prices and the Czech equity markets had a deservedly poor reputation.
Reports of abuses of minority shareholder rights were common and at first there was little
effort at creating a regulatory structure for trading and registration. The OECD  !!"&'
% (p.64) describes several common fraudulent practices. The most common
was called “tunneling.” A shareholder meeting is called quickly so only colluding share-
owners are able to participate. The meeting approves a purchase or sale of assets by the
Board that will benefit individuals. There are no rules that can hold the Board responsibleBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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for damaging the interests of the company so there is no recourse once the shareholder
meeting is held. Another technique used is for a company to sell assets to another entity
with a long settlement date. The buyer liquidates the assets and declares bankruptcy before
settlement is due.
In 1997, the government and the financial community began steps to create a regulato-
ry structure for the equity markets and to introduce some rules for corporate governance.
Legislative changes limited the banks’ ability to hold controlling interests in non-financial
firms, placed limits on the share holding by banks and the activities of bank managers in
other companies and limited the holdings by an IPF in any one company in order to distin-
guish between investment funds and holding companies. Although these rules were intro-
duced in order to harmonize with EU practice, they might have the effect of forestalling
enterprise restructuring. Mergers and acquisitions and similar activities by large sharehol-
ders can lead to beneficial restructuring of the economy. There are other mechanisms for
protecting minority shareholder rights in such a context. Another element of reform was
the creation in 1998 of a Securities Commission with broad powers to enforce regulations
and oversee trading activity. However, the commission is not an independent rule-making
body that would have the power to initiate regulations that would increase the transparency
of OTC trades and eliminate some of the dubious corporate governance practices. Finally,
in 2001 additional commercial legislation was enacted that, among other things, strengt-
hened minority share holder rights, tightened disclosure requirements and increased the
powers of the Securities commission.
Despite the improvements in the legal framework, the capital markets in the Czech
Republic are illiquid; investor confidence is shaky and brokerage firms have scaled back
their activities. There have been no successful IPOs since the stock market opened. Tra-
ding is dominated by a few companies (banks, telecoms, power generating company). It is
possible that trading activity for the best and strongest Czech companies will move abroad.
At least four big companies are listed as GDRs in London. If this develops, then the local
markets would merely be a trading venue for small companies.  In summary, voucher pri-
vatization thrust the Czech stock market into prominence that was not deserved. It is not
now serving any significant role in the intermediation process.
The Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE), the only one in Hungary, was established in
1990 and the legislation providing a legal framework and regulatory agency was passed at
the same time. In addition to equities, government securities are traded through the BSE’s
automated systems. In fact, government securities accounted for two-thirds of total stock
market capitalization at the end of 1995. Although there were 42 listed companies at that
time, the two largest accounted for 47 percent of equity market value and only four com-
panies had a capitalization greater than $150 million. Equity trading volume was about
one-third of total trading value in 1995 (up from 10 percent in 1993).
Hungary did not choose a mass privatization program or distribute vouchers. Once the
legislation to govern privatization was enacted in 1995, privatizations have occurred ra-
pidly, including those of public utilities and banks.  The number of companies traded inc-
reased but only reached 66 at the end of 1999. Stock market capitalization has increased
rapidly from 1995 to 1997 and has leveled off since at almost one-third of GDP. As a result
the listed companies in Hungary tend to be larger than in neighboring countries and the
markets are somewhat more liquid. There have been aggressive efforts to privatize the
economy, which were virtually completed by 2000.
A distinguishing characteristic of the BSE is that foreigners own more than three-quarters
of the shares traded and domestic small investors own only about 10 percent of the total.
As a consequence of extensive foreign ownership, Hungarian stock prices were severely
affected by the Russian crisis in 1998 and did not regain their peak for two years.John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
Lessons from the first decade
30
One large Hungarian company (the telecommunications company, MATAV) is listed
on the NY Stock Exchange as an ADR after making an IPO in November 1997 and others
are traded in Europe. In 1995, the Hungarian savings bank, OTP, completed an interna-
tional private placement of about one-fifth of its shares.
Russian securities markets date to the start of transition, 1990-91, when a number of
Russian firms, mostly banks and trading companies, were established as joint stock com-
panies and began to sell shares to the public. A stock market opened in Moscow in 1991
and over 100 regional markets emerged.  The extensive mass privatization program in
1992-94 spurred the development of trading in equities and in privatization vouchers on
the regional markets and through over the counter arrangements.  Shares in over 15,000
former state enterprises were sold through voucher auctions that resulted in widely disper-
sed  stock ownership.  Once the privatization program ended in mid-1994, trading on the
stock exchanges diminished and most trading was done in an informal dealer market. Ho-
wever, insider trading of blocks of shares often manipulated prices and there was little con-
fidence in reported stock prices. Widespread stock ownership emerged before there was a
reliable institutional structure for trading, clearing, settlement, registration or oversight of
brokers and dealers. In brief, secondary market trading that would induce companies to
restructure and would enable outsiders to gain control or influence just did not emerge. The
later privatizations efforts through ‘loans for shares’ arrangements just made matters wor-
se. Foreign investors were excluded; the transactions were not transparent and favored tho-
se tied to the government.
As elsewhere, market capitalization and trading activity is concentrated in a handful of
large companies. The ten largest companies consisted of about one-half of the total capita-
lization.  At the end of 1995 there were three companies with capitalization in excess of $1
billion and 14 in excess of $150 million.  Trading volume was even more concentrated
with the four most active shares contributing one-half of all trading and the eight most ac-
tive contributing over three-fourths of total volume. In 1994-95, most companies in Russia,
including the large internationally known and active natural resource companies (e.g.
Gazprom, Norilsk Nickel), were trading at a fraction of book value. There were several
explanations for this. First, it was feared that the firms might have hidden liabilities such as
social obligations to workers or yet unspecified taxes and regulations.  Second, it was fea-
red that managers and others would be able to steal assets without any regard for the rights
of shareholders. Third, it was feared that share sales would not be properly registered and
owners would be unable to prove or assert share ownership. Many of the problems with
Russian equity markets stem from the privatization procedures (see )*%+
,		 !!-) that often solidified the power of managers by transferring
controlling blocks of shares to employees. Insiders controlled almost three-quarters of the
privatized firms and outside ownership was often less than 20 percent. Expectations that
the sale of residual state shares on secondary markets and competitive markets for share
blocks would transform corporate control turned out to be unrealistic. Ownership of the
largest companies is much more diffused and although insiders tend not to have a control-
ling interest, insiders along with the banking groups are able to maintain control of mana-
gement.
A regulatory agency – the Federal Commission on Securities and the Capital Market –
was established in 1994.  The commission had a small staff and a difficult time catching up
with market developments. Nevertheless, the commission did assist in the establishment of
the Russian Trading System in mid-1995, a national electronic market that links various
markets and brokers and also provides for rule making and self-regulation.  A World Bank
report (Fine and Karlova, 1998) indicates that the system has been very successful in im-
proving the trading environment in Russia. Off market trading and attempts at price mani-Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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pulation through such trading have declined and spreads are smaller for companies using
the price setting mechanism. At the end of 1997 daily bid and offers were set for over 200
companies and 700 additional companies were registered for trading on the system.
The trading system and regulatory structure promised to bring transparency of prices
and eliminate registration problems that existed earlier. Particularly, for the largest Russian
companies, the equity market quickly became an international investment vehicle with
wide investor interest. Although, the trading system improved market transparency, the
extensive control of firms by Russian financial groups and interlocking ownership by these
groups continued to inhibit the development of the corporate sector. Nevertheless, the Rus-
sian equity market boomed throughout 1996 and 1997. Total market capitalization doubled
in 1996 and tripled again in 1997. Although, the number of issues increased, the expansion
was mostly due to price increases. Many large Russian companies were able to access in-
ternational capital markets even though corporate governance and disclosure lagged Wes-
tern standards. Optimism about the Russian economy seemed to outweigh any other con-
cerns. Several large Russian natural resource companies had capitalizations in the billions
of dollars.
All of this, of course, changed with the Russian economic crisis and debt default in
1998. By September the IFC total returns index, which had doubled in 1997, was 75 per-
cent below its June 1998 level. Stock market performance has been spotty since 1998 with
some recovery followed by declines despite distinct improvements in the economy. Tra-
ding volume is small and is dominated by a few companies.
Concerns about the institutional environment for investors have impaired any impro-
vement in the Russian stock market. The damage done by the 1998 crisis lingers and the
stock market is not playing a role in development. If Russian equity markets have any role
it is through the Russian companies traded abroad.
Equity share issues were first permitted in China in 1990 and two stock exchanges
opened at that time. The market grew rapidly after 1995 when China introduced a policy of
gradually turning state owned enterprises into joint stock companies. By the end of 1996
there were 540 companies listed and by the end of 1997 the number reached 764. Most of
the firms listed are state controlled enterprises with most shares held by the state or emplo-
yees. Thus, there is little shareholder control of firms or any opportunity to use the stock
market to gain control.  Although public listings are supposed to enterprise reforms, the
stock market does not serve as a vehicle for reform. Despite the stated commitment to re-
form, enterprises remain largely in government hands and significant improvements have
yet to occur (see Boardman, 1999). Disclosure standards, proper accounting procedures,
shareholder protections, independent directors are all largely lacking. Financial sector re-
forms will accelerate somewhat as part of commitments made by China in order to join the
World Trade Organization.
Unlike other transition economies, the equity market in China is viewed as a means of
raising capital for enterprises that remain majority state owned rather than as a vehicle for
privatization. About $10 billion was raised in various types of stock issues in both 1998
and 1999 and about $25 billion in 2000 (Citibank – Salomon Smith Barney estimates).
This fund raising performance is remarkable in the light of the overall environment main-
tains government control of firms. Some Chinese companies have been able to access in-
ternational equity markets. Companies have raised capital by issuing shares on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange or issuing ADRs. By 1997 there were 10 Chinese ADRs traded on
the New York Stock Exchange.John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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3.3  Bond markets in the transition economies
With all of their limitations, the equity markets in the transition economies are much more
advanced than bond markets. With the exception of government bond markets and a hand-
ful of companies with access to international markets, bond markets are very small. Howe-
ver, it should also be noted that many of the advanced transition economies are very small
countries. Capital markets in developed small countries are often small because of close
links to capital markets in neighboring countries. Thus, it is not surprising that German and
Austrian financial institutions and markets are active in the region and that independent
publicly traded bond markets might not emerge in each transition country. Direct access to
foreign markets by companies in the transition economies is already a significant source of
finance. It facilitates capital inflow and improves the efficiency of allocation even in the
absence of local bond markets.
Bond markets can be separated into three components:
1.  *. Large government deficits lead to the sale of debt to both
the public and to financial institutions.  However, there are only rarely active secondary
markets for bonds since most of the government debt is purchased and held by the
banks. State owned banks that have run up large bad debt portfolios from enterprise
lending and privatized banks that lack lending expertise will often prefer to simply hold
government debt.
2.  *	. Corporate bond markets that can funnel domestic savings to
enterprises are rare in transition economies. There are relatively few instances of local
debt instruments sold and these are often private placements rather than public debt.
Thus, secondary debt markets are virtually unheard of. One of the reasons for this is
that the financial institutions that can be expected to participate in these markets – insu-
rance companies, pension funds – are also undeveloped. Private sector bond markets
are really a missing element of capital market development.
3.  #		
. It is common for both governments and the largest and best enter-
prises to tap international debt markets. Most of the transition economies have done
some sovereign borrowing in major currencies on world markets. Most of the transition
countries have sovereign debt ratings and in many instances the spreads over Western
government yields were surprisingly small prior to the Russian crisis. In addition, many
large enterprises in the transition economies are able to borrow on international debt
markets. Privately placed and publicly traded issues are common and substantial. Only
the best companies can tap foreign markets but there are a surprisingly large number of
issues from the advanced transition countries. Much of the portfolio investment flo-
wing into Central and Eastern Europe is in the form of bond issues or syndicated loans
in foreign markets.
From the point of view of financial sector development and improved intermediation, the
domestic corporate bond market provides many advantages. First, a domestic currency
bond market helps insulate a country from external shocks. Second, it promotes disclosure
and transparency. Third, long term lending by banks was often based on cronyism or other
ties rather than sound credit analysis. As banks improve they are less willing to provide
such financing and the bond market provides a market-based alternative. Nevertheless,Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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developing a bond market is a daunting task that few emerging market economies have
tackled.
3.4  Country experiences: Public sector and international
               bond  markets
The Hungarian economy flirted with transition in the 1980s well before the actual political
transition began. There were bond issues by some enterprises and local authorities starting
in 1982 but these issues ceased when inflation increased. The government sold mostly
short-term securities to individuals and to financial institutions. Since 1992, the govern-
ment began to issue somewhat longer-term securities. Two and three year fixed rate bonds
were introduced in 1996, five year bonds in the following year and most recently, a ten
year note. It was anxious to do so because the benchmark ten-year government interest rate
is one of the convergence criteria for the euro so the development of that market was vie-
wed as an important step into Europe. Foreigners are allowed to buy issues with a maturity
of at least one year and account for about 10 percent of holdings. Hungarian government
entities tapped international bond markets throughout the 1990s, usually raising more than
one billion dollars per year. Hungary was by far the biggest sovereign borrower in the re-
gion, raising as much as $3.9 billion in one year (1993).
The situation in Poland is similar; there is substantial trading of government bond is-
sues while the domestic corporate bond market is very small and the private equity market
somewhat larger. The Polish government was not able to tap international bond markets
until 1994 when it resolved its relationships with bank creditors regarding pre-transition
debts. As firms began to restructure, Eurodollar lending began to appear. Among the first
such issues was a $50 million three-year note by the Polish Development Bank in early
1996.  In addition, there have been zloty bond issues by some international organizations
starting in 1996. At the end of 1997, 56 government bond issues were listed on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange and trading volume was about as large as equity trading.
Capital markets have been less significant in the Czech Republic than elsewhere in the
region because of the dominant role of bank financing and the ties between the banks and
the investment funds. In 1995, the outstanding government debt (because of the sound fis-
cal position of the Czech Republic in the early transition years) was only slightly larger
than the corporate market. Government debt issuance increased subsequently although
most of it was short term. The Czech government has tapped foreign bond markets
throughout the 1990s but it has borrowed less than the Hungarians have (about $350 milli-
on per year from 1990-96, see Sobol, 1997). In 1994 the Czech state owned power compa-
ny was the first enterprise in the region to tap Eurobond markets directly with a $150 mil-
lion issue and in 1996 Komercni Bank issued $250 million in Eurobonds.
Foreign capital market access by Czech firms has out-paced domestic market deve-
lopment. Moreover, there is an offshore market for bonds denominated in the local curren-
cy, Eurokrona issues. The biggest issuers are the Czech banks that on lend the funds to
Czech firms (IMF %&'
 !!8/36). By mid-1997 there was $4
billion in such liabilities (similar markets exist in Poland and Hungary but they are much
smaller, about $600 million and $400 million respectively). The World Bank has also used
the Eurokrona market with an issue of almost $100 million in 1995.
The Russian capital markets developed rapidly but unevenly in the mid-1990s. The
most organized market was the market for government securities. The short-term, zero
coupon notes known as GKOs traded daily on the Moscow International Currency Ex-John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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change. The government relied on the GKO market to finance the deficit and Russian
commercial banks were originally the main purchasers. The GKO market was touted as an
active and efficient domestic money market. After a while, high yields were used to pull
investor interest from foreign exchange markets. The volume of GKOs expanded rapidly,
reaching 3.2 percent of GDP in 1994. When the ruble exchange rate was relatively stable,
the GKOs provided generous and seemingly safe returns to foreign investors.  The willing-
ness of foreign investors to absorb GKOs provided a noninflationary means of deficit fi-
nancing. However, by 1997 investors began to leave GKOs and buy foreign exchange and
by early 1998 interest costs on existing debt exceeded the government’s ability to issue
new bonds. The collapse of the GKO market was the first step of the Russian 1998 crisis.
In addition to GKOs the Russian government issued dollar denominated domestic
bonds called MinFins starting in 1993 many of which were purchased by foreigners. Furt-
her, the Russian government was accepted by the world’s debtor clubs and began selling
Eurobonds in November 1996. There were two issues that totaled $3.75 billion sold at high
yields in June 1998, just before the financial crisis. Finally, many local government autho-
rities have issued their own bonds. By mid-1997, Russian banks owned about $27 billion
in government debt and non-official foreign owners held about $45 billion in post-Soviet
government debt (IMF, .
  )
 December 1998). The ability of the
Russian government to tap international capital markets and the level of activity in the
ruble bill and bond markets gave the appearances of extensive development of the financial
system until the 1998 crisis.
The Russian sovereign entry into international markets was followed quickly by pri-
vate sector borrowing abroad. The first Russian companies to directly access world debt
markets were three Russian banks that sold three-year dollar bonds in 1997. The yields
were very high but the deals were viewed as a way of gaining international exposure for
Russian institutions that obtained credit ratings and had their reputations enhanced by the
deals. In July 1997, the Russian oil giant Lukoil raised $125 million with a one year private
placement. Another oil company followed a month later with a three year floating rate
public debt issue arranged by Salomon Brothers. The cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg
also entered the Euro markets. In 1997, Russian entities were able to borrow with spreads
that were usually 300-400 basis points over U.S. Treasuries. Over $3 billion was raised in
international capital markets in 1997 and observers were predicting that the world debt
markets would finance the rebuilding of Russia.
Of course, all of this activity ceased in the summer of 1998. Although national and
international markets remain thin and bondholders are understandably wary following the
sovereign default, there has been a slow recovery and yields on Russian bonds have decli-
ned from the crisis levels. Furthermore, some private sector lenders that were previously
crowded out by government borrowing have been able to access bond markets. These are
typically large Russian enterprises with substantial hard currency revenues from natural
resource industries.
Bond issuance in China grew very rapidly in the 1990s. It is largely government debt
although it is used to finance enterprise expansion as well as to finance the deficit. Bonds
are largely owned by the household sector that has a high savings rate and few alternative
investment vehicles. Interest rates on bonds and on bank deposits were determined admini-
stratively. There have also been sovereign debt issues in international markets but these are
offset by China’s large foreign exchange reserves. China’s bond and stock markets are a
source of funding for industry, which gives the appearance of a market-based mechanism
for the allocation of capital but it is just the appearance. Funds are allocated to state enter-
prises and new private sector enterprises rely on self-financing.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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Bond markets for enterprise financing in other transition economies are tiny. Howe-
ver, many countries have made efforts to develop secondary markets for government debt
in order to facilitate monetary policy operations. For example, as interest rates on govern-
ment securities have become more market determined, the central bank of Romania has
begun using repurchase agreements and reverse repurchases as an instrument of monetary
control. This is likely to be common as central banks develop modern policy instruments.
3.5  Lessons for the capital markets
Bond markets in the transition economies are for the most part offshoots of government
fiscal policy. In addition, large companies in the region can access financing from abroad,
which has inhibited the development of local markets. There was little need to develop a
sales or distribution network for domestic bond issues in small economies, if foreign mar-
kets are accessible for large companies and private market placements feasible for small
companies.  Although the inhibiting effect is unfortunate, the reputational effect of inter-
national capital market acceptance is valuable.
Domestic private debt markets have been slow to develop for several reasons:
1.  The lack of transparency about corporate restructuring;
2.  Poor accounting and disclosure that make it impossible to monitor the use of funds and
the absence of a legal framework to clearly define the rights of creditors;
3.  Power of insiders that gives creditors little influence over management and little re-
course in event of default;
4. Bond pricing is difficult since it requires some knowledge of default
      probabilities and expectations of asset recovery.
Nevertheless, there may be reasons to expect the domestic bond markets to expand:
1.  As restructured enterprises will be able to issue bonds at rates that are more favorable
than bank loans;
2.  And as the development of other financial institutions such as life insurance companies
and private pension funds creates demand for debt instruments.
Recent discussions of financial development in transition economies emphasize the im-
portance of a wide spectrum of financial instruments and markets. A broad variety of fi-
nancial instruments helps an economy absorb shocks and provide useful information to the
markets. In particular, Herring and Chatusripitak (2000) argue that the absence of private
sector bond markets had a significant role in making the Asian financial sector crisis so
serious. They conclude (p.4) that the Asian reliance on bank financing and the “the absence
of a bond market may render an economy less efficient and significantly more vulnerable
to financial crisis.”  Sharma (2001) examines corporate financing patterns in Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia and concludes that the interlocking relationships between banks
and corporations, often through family owned conglomerates, discourage the development
of bond financing.  Thus, bond markets are less likely to develop when the banking sectorJohn Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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is not independent (e.g. the Czech Republic where funds tie the banks to corporations and
Russia where the industrial groups often control banks as well).  The very fact that is a
topic of interest in the advanced transition economies indicates how far they have come;
the issues faced in central Europe are emerging market and not transition issues.
Building local corporate bond markets is a difficult task that is currently being addressed
by emerging market countries around the world. To begin, it requires the existence of a
critical mass of corporate issuers and of potential holders. There have to be intermediary
firms to develop the clientele on both the supply and demand sides and to bring them to-
gether. In order to do so, a number of ancillary developments might be needed in advance.
First, institutional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, investment funds) that
might hold the corporate bonds must exist. Second, a government securities market is often
used to set pricing benchmarks. Many transition economies, particularly those interested in
joining the euro area, have made efforts to develop government securities benchmarks.
Third, investors might require the development of credit ratings agencies, which will need
a critical mass of activity to succeed.
11
Although the benefits of local bond markets are well understood, the difficulty in es-
tablishing them may be underestimated. Small emerging market economies might not ge-
nerate the amount of activity needed to sustain market institutions. Thus, with the excepti-
on of Russia, China and perhaps a few others, larger enterprises will use international bond
markets and domestic markets may stay small. This provides a gap in the opportunity to
gain financing between the very largest companies in a small economy and all the rest.
However, this is not a transition problem but will be one increasingly faced by all small
open economies, both emerging markets and fully developed wealthy countries.
Stock markets in the transition countries exploded on to the scene as a consequence of
privatization. All of a sudden, these economies had a large number of publicly owned
companies and quickly put together trading mechanisms for shares. In some instances, the
trading mechanisms were woefully inadequate (e.g. the difficulties with share registration
in Russia).  In other instances, they were used to manipulate corporate control because the
rules for corporate governance were inadequate. In most instances, there was a naive noti-
on that vast numbers of small enterprises would be restructured once their shares were
available for trading. This was too much to expect for equity markets that are illiquid and
where there is little reliable disclosure of information about companies. In many places the
stock market activity diminished after the initial spurt for two reasons. First, it was soon
apparent that many public companies were too small to have any meaningful stock market
activity. Second, many large companies moved to trading in the U.S. or European equity
markets. Thus, the role of the stock market is likely to be rather limited in the transition
economies (as is also true in many small emerging market and even some small industrial
countries).
Nevertheless, there are instances where the equity markets play an important role. In
Poland, a number of privatizations have taken place with IPOs that have used the Polish
equity market to determine the value of the firm. The IPO privatizations have been made
possible and have raised more revenue because of the liquidity that comes with a success-
ful market issue.  In addition, there have been successful efforts to raise new equity capital
with stock offerings.
Have capital markets increased the level of capital formation in the transition
economies? It is probably premature to argue that these markets attract or increase the level
of savings. Most individual holding of equity is the result of mass privatization. Institu-
                                                
11 For a discussion of bond market development in the context of Asian emerging markets, see
Harwood (2001).Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
37
tional investors or intermediaries like pension funds or insurance companies that mobilize
the savings of individuals and hold capital market instruments, are just getting started.  On
the other hand, it is important to remember that net portfolio investment flows to the tran-
sition economies averaged $21.1 billion per year from 1994-97. These inflows might not
have occurred at the same magnitude in the absence of the capital market development that
has occurred already.
Have capital markets improved the allocation of resources? On a positive note, equity
markets, notably in Poland and Hungary, have been used to generate substantial privatiza-
tion revenues for the government that should be viewed as an improved allocation of re-
sources. However, these revenues are rarely given to the private sector to recapitalize en-
terprises. More generally, the allocative improvements from capital markets are due to the
benefits of liquidity.
12 Liquid markets enable investors to respond to changes in business
conditions and enable entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to have an exit mechanism
through IPOs.
The equity markets have played a role in introducing market forces to price assets and
risks. In instances where IPOs have distributed large blocks of stock that were held by the
state, the market provided an important pricing mechanism. However, corporate governan-
ce is weak and boards are rarely responsive to signals from the market. Thus, the capital
markets are rarely a disciplining mechanism on management. Finally, the markets in most
countries can now facilitate ownership transfers. However, the market for corporate control
– takeovers, mergers, buying controlling interests – is still not very active.
After some years where the capital market infrastructure was inadequate, most of the
advanced transition economies have made steps to improve the operation of capital market
structures. Even in Russia, the infrastructure for capital market activity worked fairly well
in 1997-98. Trading in GKOs could take place fairly and trades could be cleared and re-
gistered. The market collapsed because of fundamental problems (the excessive increase in
supply from the government and the unregulated hedging activities of the banks) rather
than an inadequate market infrastructure.
Capital markets in more developed countries are part of a broad fabric of institutions.
They include venture capital firms and investment banks that participate in private equity
markets. Thus, there are markets for corporate control and for merger and acquisition acti-
vity of small and/or privately or tightly held firms. Similarly, developed economies will
have investment banks that are able to underwrite IPOs. The stock market, the last stage of
financial development, provides a market judgment of value and an opportunity for entre-
preneurs to exit.  They are not yet serving this role in the transition economies.
4  Missing pieces: Gaps in the institutional continuum
Developed economies provide competing paradigms for the role of financial institutions in
corporate finance. One paradigm leads to a bank-dominated financial sector; the other
leads to a more significant role for capital markets. The insider model, in which banks play
a central role in corporate governance, is based on the German and Asian financial sys-
                                                
12 Recent research on equity markets around the world (see Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000)
indicates that equity markets boost economic growth because they make investments more
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tems. The outsider model, in which capital markets plays a crucial role in disciplining
companies held widely, is based on the U.S. and U.K. systems. Due to complementarities
and synergies among institutions, each of the paradigms has a different cluster of characte-
ristics necessary to support its effective functioning.
13  For the outsider system to work
effectively, sufficient competition and market liquidity with low transaction costs are ne-
cessary. For the insider system to work effectively, the conflicts of interest between and
among stakeholders must be minimized so that consensus-based decision-making is not
overly costly and a self-interested agent must be found to monitor compliance with the
agreement. For a bank to play the latter role it is crucial that the bank be able to avoid
capture by the stakeholders and also be able to address the inherent conflict of interest
between its role as a debt and an equity holder. Otherwise the bank’s cash flow is readily
available to its company-clients on non-economic terms. Furthermore the bank may find it
in its self-interest as owner to bail out its client when this would be imprudent from a cre-
ditor’s perspective. Neither set of necessary conditions is present in transition economies.
Nascent capital markets are thin and often lack the transparency necessary for the outsider
system. Banks are weak and not well suited to play the role required of them in an insider
system.
In developing economies, path dependency plays an important role in financial sector
institutional development and the paradigm followed is often due to initial conditions. In
the transition economies of Central Europe, the desire to join the European Union led to
the adoption of EU banking regulations, including universal licensing for all banks. The
choice of universal banking is likely to be an irreversible one because, once licensed, the
universal bank will attempt to protect its franchise value by limiting the entry or activity of
other institutions.
14 Hence, complementary financial institutions will develop to support the
chosen system. Unlike in the Central European countries, irreversible institutional choices
have not yet determined the eventual evolution of the financial systems in China and Rus-
sia.
Whether or not a transition economy has a bank-dominated or a market-dominated fi-
nancial sector depends crucially on the macroeconomic environment since hyperinflation
leads to severe disintermediation and currency substitution. Prior to the break-up of the
Soviet Union, the aggregate balance sheets of banks looked similar to those in Western
economies. However hyperinflation reduced significantly intermediation so that, even be-
fore the 1998 financial crisis, Russia was not a bank-dominated economy. In Bulgaria be-
fore the establishment of a currency board, hyperinflation had reduced significantly the
dominance of banks and has contributed to a similar outcome in Romania. Hyperinflation
in Poland, on the eve of the transition, resulted in two-thirds of the money supply being
denominated in dollars. The credible exchange peg in Poland at the beginning of the tran-
sition allowed the banking sector to re-establish its dominance. The creation of a currency
board in Bulgaria in 1997 has promoted macroeconomic stability that facilitated a banking
recovery and bank privatization to foreign owners..
The paradigm for corporate finance in the transition economies depends on initial
conditions and the macroeconomic environment as well as conscious policy choices.
Whatever mix between bank and capital market finance emerges, there are still other im-
portant capital market institutions and instruments that play essential roles in developed
                                                
13 See Corbet and Mayer (1992) for a characterization of the two paradigms with an application to
transition economies.
14 See Raghuram G. Rajan (1998) for a model in which allowing universal banking effectively
precludes the development of specialized banking even though the latter is more efficient and
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country financial markets.  These market structures are largely lacking in the transition
countries; they are the missing pieces.
In this section, we examine three broad and interrelated missing pieces: entrepre-
neurial finance, other (than equities and government bonds) capital market instruments and
institutional investors (non-bank financial intermediaries).
4.1  Entrepreneurial finance
Entrepreneurial financing runs the gamut from start-up funds to support the launching of
new companies to growth financing for successful small and medium size enterprises
(SMEs). Such transactions have important demand and supply components that are hardly
unique to transition economies. On the supply side, the riskiness of these ventures is
thought to make them unattractive to banks and, hence, these activities will be credit-
constrained. On the demand side, the adverse selection argument indicates that firms that
are successful have no need to access external credit markets so that the only borrowers
left seeking outside financing will be ‘lemons.’ Creditors fearing adverse selection refuse
to lend to the entire pool of borrowers and banks maintain below market clearing interest
rates and ration credit according to other criteria.  These problems are endemic to entrepre-
neurial finance and various institutions to surmount them have evolved in developed capi-
tal markets. In many instances, market imperfections for the financing of SMEs lead to
government efforts to provide subsidized programs for start-up financing and micro len-
ding.
Some of the literature on entrepreneurial finance in transition economies indicates that
credit market imperfections are not serious impediments and that start-ups have succeeded
without any apparent financing difficulties. For example, Czako and Vajda (1993) exa-
mined the sources of SME start-up and continuing financing in the early stage of the tran-
sition in Hungary and found that only about a quarter of the companies surveyed used eit-
her bank or concessionary loans for start-up financing. Furthermore, of the less than 20%
of these Hungarian companies that reported the need for subsequent capital, only about
20% used concessionary financing while almost 45% attracted bank financing. In another
study of small private firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, Bratkowski,
Grosfeld, and Rostowski (1998) concluded that bank financing worked quite well. The
authors found no evidence of supply constraints on credit to SMEs nor did they find com-
pelling evidence of adverse selection and concluded that imperfections in capital markets
were not impeding growth in these three fast-track countries.
15
 At the entry stage, a variety of programs can be found in the transition economies to
provide subsidized financing for start ups. In an investigation of the early transition period
in Hungary, Laky, (1994) found that the START program administered under the super-
vision of the Hungarian National Bank and designed to provide subsidized long-term credit
for SMEs was successful enough to lead to a second stage of funding. In the Czech Re-
public, a specialized bank administers a variety of subsidized programs for SMEs. Partici-
pation in these programs has varied over time and interest seems to have fallen off in re-
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cent years. In Russia, subsidized micro-lending programs have been funded by both the
EBRD and the US-Russia fund and operated through Russian financial institutions.
16
Government subsidized programs for start-up ventures can provide a useful source of
initial financing for a small number of companies in transition economies when linked to
the proper existing institutions. The institutional infrastructure needs to be in place so that
start-ups do not view the subsidized credit mechanism as a continuing source of funds.
Removing government influence from credit allocation to new enterprises is often a source
of difficulty. Governments are often anxious to channel funds to favored industries and
areas or to encourage new technology, which often leads to continued reliance on subsidi-
zed credit sources. Whether government efforts to direct funds are worthwhile is a subject
of much debate. However, these programs can not fill the gap of bridge financing needed
for the next stage of growth in which successful SMEs without the history necessary to
attract bank credit and in financial sectors without the institutions that prepare companies
to use capital markets must find longer term external financing.
Sustainable growth will depend strongly on the ability of successful SMEs to attract
financing so that there is reason to be concerned about the SME sector. For example, alt-
hough the total stock of real credit has increased by more than 20% from 1994 in Hungary,
small enterprises received less than half of their 1994 level in 1998 (OECD, 
%,/	, 1999, p.86). Banks prefer to do business with medium and large enter-
prises and have moved aggressively into retail markets. As a result of high failure rates and
poor information about new SMEs, there are stiff bank collateral requirements that often
foreclose any possibility of bank lending.
Pissarides (2001) investigates the sources of finance for large enterprises, basically
SOEs, and SMEs using sample survey data collected by the EBRD for 1999 to 2000 from
five South Eastern European countries. She concludes that internal financing is the do-
minant source of funds for both types of enterprises in these countries. Among large enter-
prises, state financing accounts for 10% if the funds in Bulgaria, about 8% in Croatia and
less than 5% in Romania. Local bank financing is important for large enterprises in Roma-
nian and for all enterprises in Croatia. In Romania, 23% of large enterprises use local bank
financing while 14% of the large enterprises and 18% of SMEs in Croatia use this source
of funds. In Bulgaria, about 8% of large enterprises and 6% of SMEs use bank financing.
Only 7% of the SMEs in Romania use local bank financing. Interestingly, 8% of the large
enterprises surveyed in Croatia listed foreign bank financing as a source of funds while the
percentage for SMEs was 3%.  In Romania and Bulgaria, about 2% of large enterprises and
1% of SMEs used foreign bank financing. Taken from this perspective, only in Croatia
banks, both local and foreign, play an important role in overall business financing in the
five SEE countries studied while local Romanian banks are still the principle outside sour-
ce of funds for large enterprises. In Bulgaria, the state is still the main external source of
financing for large enterprises.
An enormously important source of private financing for start-ups and SMEs in both
developed and developing countries is the venture capital industry. The availability of risk
financing for new enterprises and SME expansion is organized around individuals and
firms who seek such opportunities and market them to potential sources of capital. The
venture capital industry is particularly important in countries where banks do not make
equity investments. However, even under universal banking, banks often prefer customers
with proven track records and shun new enterprises and longer-term commitments and
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risks that are hard to judge. Thus, the role of venture capital as a source of finance for acti-
vities with high risk and potentially large impacts on economic development cannot be
understated.
There are indications of significant developments in entrepreneurial financing (see
OECD 2001 on Poland). For example, professionally managed venture capital funds in
Poland reached $2 billion in 2000. In addition, small and medium enterprises report a gro-
wing array of financing possibilities. There are many leasing firms in Poland and they are
growing rapidly. Furthermore, the emerging competitive banking industry provides lending
to small and new firms. The combination of a venture industry, bank financing and leasing
provide an encouraging picture. IPOs and listings on the local equity market are a last and
perhaps less important step than these other developments.
The venture capital institutions found in more developed economies include angel fi-
nancing (individuals who take risk stakes in new ventures), venture capital funds that pool
capital and take equity or lending positions and venture capital firms that evaluate and
market opportunities. All of these institutions are yet to develop in the transition economies
with few exceptions. The venture capital industry in developed economies looks to the
equity markets, as well as merger and acquisition activity of larger firms, as exit
mechanisms. Thus, the continued development of liquid equity markets might lead to inc-
reased availability of entrepreneurial finance. There are already instances of private equity
fund investments in the advanced transition economies. Leasing is another important in-
strument for enterprise financing. It has growth rapidly in the transition countries, some of
it by banks and some by other intermediaries.
4.2  Missing capital market instruments
This section and the next are simply a statement of how wide the gap in institutional deve-
lopment happens to be. There are myriads of other capital market instruments and non-
bank institutions that are both essential to the operation of a mature financial system and
largely nonexistent in the transition economies. To begin, we look at some of the country
experiences to see what kinds of capital market activity (in addition to the equity and go-
vernment bond markets discussed earlier) exist.
Hungary stands out among the transition countries because there is a reasonable
amount of capital market financing, mostly through private placements. There are a num-
ber of funds that make equity investments in companies; about $400 million has been
committed in about 100 deals. In at least one instance, the equity investment led to an in-
ternational stock issue. There are also instances of debt financing by Hungarian companies
with issues in local currency purchased by foreign and domestic investors although there is
little evidence of secondary markets emerging for such issues. In 1996, corporate bonds
accounted for just 0.1 percent of trading on the Budapest Stock Exchange.
By the end of 1998, about $1 billion was invested in Poland by private equity funds
with investments in both new and existing enterprises. Some large companies have issued
bonds internationally but there have been fewer than ten domestic issues with maturities
more than one year. Nevertheless, the capital markets are developing; there was a zloty
bond issue in 1998 that exceeded $100 million. A pharmaceutical company (a 1990 start-
up venture) was scheduled to sell about $12 million in zloty bonds on the domestic Polish
market in early 1999.
Capital markets in the bank-dominated Czech Republic are relatively undeveloped
with the exception of corporate bond issues by so-called “blue chip” issuers. By mid-1995,John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
Lessons from the first decade
42
there were eight bond issues with a total of about $1.25 billion outstanding. However, there
was little secondary market trading of bonds.
A telling indication of the limited development of the Russian capital market was that
private sector domestic debt instruments (other than the inter-bank market) are virtually
non-existent. There have been a few issues of collateralized debt by companies but there
are no domestic corporate bond issues.  Similarly, in China, only one percent of total fixed
investment in 1996 was financed by any capital market issues. In addition, capital market
developments are often miniscule once we look passed the advanced transition economies.
For example, Bulgaria has made substantial progress since the currency board was introdu-
ced in 1997; banking is fairly stable and some other institutions have emerged. However,
in 1999, the new pension funds had only $15 million in assets and the finance companies
only $57 million.
A major factor that inhibits the growth of capital market instruments is the absence of
the institutional investors and non-bank financial intermediaries that are the potential hol-
ders of such instruments. We noted earlier that the presence of a private sector bond market
could help develop a financial sector that can absorb internal and external shocks. Howe-
ver, such a market requires both supply and demand development. Institutional investors
that are independent of the dominant banks can provide the missing demand.
4.3  Missing sector: Housing finance
After corporate issues, the most prominent capital market instruments in developed coun-
ties are mortgages. Mortgage financing for commercial and residential building is virtually
non-existent in the transition economies. In large OECD countries (e.g., U.S., U.K., Ger-
many), the stock of mortgage loans is often over 50 percent of GDP. Even in France,
which has a weaker tradition of mortgage lending, this stock is 50% and, in Italy, it is
about 10%. The only transition economy with a mortgage loan to GDP ratio over 5 percent
in 2000 was Estonia. In the other advanced transition economies, this ratio is about 2 or 3
percent. Nevertheless, these markets have grown rapidly since the mid-1990s, often by a
factor of three or more. Mortgage financing in the transition economies often lacks many
of the characteristics found in more developed markets. Loan to value ratios are small,
maturities are short, and the loans are often denominated in foreign currencies to counte-
ract domestic macro instabilities.
There is a good reason why this important element of the financial sector lags in tran-
sition economies.  The privatization of the housing stock has still not occurred in some
transition economies and ownership rights are often ambiguous (see Struyk, 1996). There
are ambiguities in the legal structure governing housing ownership in even the most ad-
vanced transition countries. For example, the housing stock in Hungary was privatized at
the start of the transition process and most housing is owner occupied. Existing subsidized
mortgages were rationalized when holders were offered the chance to pay them down or
have them rewritten at market interest rates. Many Hungarian homeowners chose to pay
off their mortgages. Nevertheless, in most transition economies, the procedures for dealing
with mortgage loans in default are likely to involve lengthy legal problems with uncertain
outcomes. In the best of circumstances, these institutional problems inhibit the develop-
ment of housing finance and home-equity loans.
In developed countries, the government has often played a role in the development of
mortgage instruments and markets by providing guarantees or by creating subsidized or
protected institutions.  The transition countries have made efforts to develop mortgageBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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markets. Even before transition, there was mortgage lending by state-owned banks, which
was a way to extend subsidies to the housing sector. In the early stages of transition, simi-
lar facilities for channeling subsides were developed. In Poland, where housing loans had
been arranged with associations rather than individuals, a mortgage liquidity facility provi-
ded funds to commercial banks for subsidized mortgage lending. Truly market-based
mortgage institutions did not start to emerge until the late 1990s. In 1997, both Poland and
Hungary passed legislation establishing mortgage banks. These institutions are not very
active yet, the first issue of Polish mortgage bonds was sold in June 2000 (see OECD,
2002).  Similar developments are underway throughout Central and Eastern Europe. There
are different models for mortgage institutions and differences in the extent to which they
will be used to channel public funding. Although government efforts at institutional buil-
ding are probably needed, there is a tendency to emphasize institutions for extending sub-
sidies to the housing sector.  Market-based intermediaries that collect deposits or issue
bonds in order to finance mortgage lending have a long way to go.
The successful development of mortgage markets requires a number of elements.
First, the legal structure for ownership and the use of mortgage instruments needs to be in
place. Second, there needs to be a source of funds from either deposit or through subsidies.
There is no lack of deposit sources in transition economies but the institutional develop-
ments must make mortgage holding as attractive as government securities. Finally, mac-
roeconomic stability is required to encourage the use of long-term instruments.
4.4  Institutional investors and non-bank financial
              intermediaries
The least developed segment of financial markets in most transition economies is the one
consisting of non-bank financial intermediaries such as life insurance companies and pri-
vate pension funds. With the exception of share purchases, households are rarely the direct
sources of financing to enterprises. Instead households tend to participate in contractual
savings plans such as insurance contracts and pension funds, which in turn purchase capital
market instruments. Thus, the development of a domestic market for private placements,
corporate bonds, or mortgages is unlikely to occur until the demand for such debt appears.
Both life and non-life insurance companies exist throughout the transition world. Ho-
wever, legislative frameworks for the industry were developed only in the mid 1990s and
the industry did not begin to grow until later in the decade (Pye 2000). Nevertheless, there
have been rapid gains in the advanced transition countries over the last several years. A
stable life insurance industry has appeared in the Czech Republic, Hungary (largely with
foreign firms), Poland and Slovenia.
17 In most transition countries, the industry is highly
concentrated and, in many cases, the former state insurance company dominates. Industry
penetration is deepest in countries that allowed foreign companies to participate from the
start. The non-life segment (largely automobile insurance) is larger than the life segment,
which has a more significant savings component and a larger impact on capital markets.
Premium income from life insurance in 1998 exceeded one per cent of GDP in only one
transition country (Poland where it was 1.02%). The average among OECD countries in
1994 was 4.26 percent. Non-life premiums are considerably larger, more than 2% of GDP
in four advanced transition economies.
                                                
17 See the EBRD, 	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The competitive and weakly regulated industry in Russia is problematic. It grew very
quickly and, in 1995, there were 2700 insurance firms in Russia that collected $2.5 billion
in premia. However, the insurance contracts were short-run savings vehicles that enabled
the holders to avoid taxes; the industry collapsed in 1996 when the tax laws changed. The-
re are still a large number of companies, including many unlicensed operations, and regu-
lation is very weak. Furthermore, foreign entry is restricted so there are no external in-
fluences that might lead to improved industry conditions.
Pension reform and the creation of private funds have been subject to much debate in
all the transition economies. Legislation both to allow and to encourage private pension
funds has been passed in several places and this industry should emerge soon. As of 1996,
only six transition countries, Russia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Slovak Republic and the
Czech Republic, had a legal framework for the governance and regulation of private pensi-
on funds . Quite a few funds have been set up in these countries with over one million
Czech workers and one-quarter million Hungarian workers covered. Nevertheless, fund
assets under management are still miniscule.
In 1998, both Poland and Hungary introduced private pillars of the pension system
that include a mandatory participation component.  Pension funds have grown rapidly in
just a few years. However, there is likely to be a period of consolidation in the fund indust-
ry. Regulators will have to develop means for monitoring the industry and will relax rest-
rictions gradually on investments. It is too early to tell how these institutions will affect
financial intermediations. The potential for growth is enormous and private pension funds
could quickly become a major influence on capital markets. However, the potential for
error and abuses in fund management is also large.
The potential for capital market failures and abuses is still large throughout much of
the transition world even as banking regulation has improved markedly. For example, the
largest mutual fund in Romania collapsed in May 2000. Clearly, the securities commission
was not fulfilling its obligations and the state saving bank was involved with the fund as
well. Banking supervision has improved markedly since the Bancorex crisis in Bulgaria
and the quality of the remaining banks is improved as well. However, the non-bank finan-
cial sector is still very weak.
Generally, institutional investors are important for at least two reasons. First, they act
as financial intermediaries that channel funds to enterprises through private placements and
direct investments. Second, they spur the development of secondary markets through their
demand for bonds and mortgages. As institutions like pension funds, insurance companies,
and mutual funds develop, there is likely to be more issuance of capital market instruments
as well. However, these institutions barely exist in most transition economies and little
progress has been made to develop them (see Blommestein, 1999).  Institutional investors
in Hungary, probably the most developed transition capital market, were still very small in
1996. Insurance company assets were about 3 percent of GDP (mostly held in government
securities), investment funds were about 2 percent and private pension funds were less than
½ of one percent of GDP (van Elkan, 1998). More recent data for the three most advanced
transition economies (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) form 2000 indicate that
total assets of institutional investors as a fraction of GDP is well under 20 percent, less
than one-tenth of the ratio in the U.S. The insurance sector is a bit larger in the Czech Re-
public (assets are 9 percent of GDP) and investment and mutual funds are the largest in
Hungary (12 percent). Thus, it would be mistake to say that, after a decade of transition,
institutional investors are non-existent in the fast-track transition economies but their scope
of activity is tiny.
The EBRD is considering domestic currency bond issues as a means of building and
developing local institutions. Such issues would enhance the credibility of markets andBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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encourage interest in such markets by both foreign and local investors. In many countries,
such sales will require legislative development regarding disclosure, listing, settlement,
accounting and exchange control issues for foreign issuers.
4.5  Regulatory structures
Our discussion of missing pieces in the financial sector would not be complete without
some mention of regulatory institutions.  Neither the legislative framework nor the institu-
tional expertise for regulatory oversight of banks, capital markets, or any other financial
sector institutions was in place when transition started. If the banks, insurance companies,
and other institutions were all state-owned enterprises, there was no perceived need for any
further regulation. Thus, the development of regulatory institutions was one of the biggest
steps taken in transition. With the assistance of international financial institutions (the IMF,
World Bank and EBRD were all very active in this area), most countries were able to in-
troduce frameworks for regulation rapidly. Of course, the responsible and adequate appli-
cation of these structures was often another matter. Our earlier discussions of banking and
equity markets noted numerous regulatory failures. However, these were more often due to
an inability to apply regulatory standards and structures rather than to an absence of insti-
tutions and laws. Remarkable progress has been made in the advanced transition countries
and elsewhere. Even in the former Soviet Union, there has been significant and extensive
development of regulatory institutions (see Knight, 1997).
The importance of responsible institutions has been demonstrated in the case of cent-
ral bank independence. In the transition countries, an independent central bank is asso-
ciated with lower inflation once the initial price shocks of the transition are passed (see
Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti, 2002).  There are of course areas that still need develop-
ment. Although many countries have deposit insurance systems, exactly how these should
work in a crisis needs to be developed. However, this is a problem that is common to many
countries, particularly those with concentrated banking systems like the ones in the transi-
tion countries.  Another issue concerns the location of regulatory powers in the central
bank, the finance ministry, or in an independent agency. The preferred organizational
structure for regulation is underdebated in developed as well as in emerging market count-
ries.John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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5  Conclusions
The performance of financial markets in the transition economies can be measured against
our expectations of the role played by such markets generally. A succinct statement is
found in an OECD report:
 “An active and efficient capital market can convey accurate information about firm
value and can serve to channel domestic and international savings to their most
productive uses. In addition, through the appropriate monitoring of managerial de-
cisions it can help to ensure the efficient (profit maximizing) behavior of firms.”
(OECD, %&'
, 1998, pp. 61-63)
Specifically, we ask whether the institutions and markets in the transition economies are
fulfilling their roles adequately or at least better than in the recent past. That is, do they:
1.  Facilitate the mobilization of savings
2.  Allocate financing to investment projects
3.  Price risk and assets
4.  Monitor corporate performance
5.  Assist the transfer of ownership
Even the most advanced transition economy institutions often fail to fulfill these functions.
This conclusion is not surprising once we realize how little time there has been for the
evolution of sophisticated institutions.  Also, such developments are often lacking in emer-
ging market countries around the world with similar levels of income.  Moreover, institu-
tional development was not the first financial sector priority. Banking reform was needed
to assure the operation of the payments system and to eliminate soft budget constraints.
Thus, the most compelling conclusion is that there remains a need for additional institu-
tional development.
This conclusion should not obscure the fact that many transition countries have cros-
sed what Berglof and Bolton (2002) recently termed the “great divide.”  The great divide
separates countries plagued with institutional backwardness and macroeconomic instability
from ‘emerging markets’ economies. An effort to categorize the transition world shows
that, ten years after the start of the process, all of the countries of Central Europe (inclu-
ding the Baltics) have crossed the divide. In addition, most of Southern European countries
(including some of the Balkans) have crossed as well. The large countries of the former
Soviet Union provide a mixed picture with elements of emerging markets and institutional
backwardness. The Central Asian republics and some of the small FSU countries have pro-
bably not crossed the divide but are showing recent signs of development in many cases.
Finally, an interesting aspect of these developments is that the pace of movement is proba-
bly much more rapid than most observers anticipated when transition started. A decade
ago, the process was expected to be long and slow; few observers would have predicted
that the term “transition economy” would in many instances be obsolete at the end of the
first decade.
Problems in the financial sector are often a reflection of real sector problems and vice
versa. Thus, the development of the financial sector has important implications for the ove-
rall well being of any transition economy.  Successful intermediation between savers and
investors requires macroeconomic stability and macroeconomic growth relies on interme-
diation to support capital formation. Similarly, there is a clear link between microeconomicBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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restructuring and the health of financial institutions. Unrestructured corporate clients cause
banks to be weak thus inhibiting effective intermediation.
The first element of financial sector development to consider is the regulatory and go-
vernmental infrastructure. In the first years of transition, government concerns with the
financial sector emphasized bad loan problems in the banks and equity issuance as part of
privatization. There was inadequate attention paid to institutional development and the
regulatory structure. A functioning regulatory system requires scarce resources and should
not be overburdened. The government must take an arms-length approach to regulating
financial institutions by promoting market mechanisms and eschewing direct interference.
Self-enforcing regulation focused on the franchise value of banks, tax codes that encourage
rather than discourage financial mergers, and the prohibition of using banks to fund go-
vernment expenditures as quasi-fiscal deficits are important lessons for regulatory systems
in the transition economies.
Three features of banking sector development that are crucial to insuring intermediati-
on on commercial terms only are:
•  Independence of bank governance from government control as early as possible
and stated as the primary goal of bank privatization programs.
•  Independence of banks from their undesirable, weak clients who may require trans-
parent fiscal assistance.
•  Independence should also allow the development of a market for institutional cont-
rol through takeovers, consolidations and strategic investments.
It is now widely accepted that the participation of foreign strategic investors in banking is
an effective way of meeting these goals. Foreign control of banking was fought bitterly in
the early stages of transition in most countries although it was accepted as a foregone con-
clusion in Hungary, partly because of the already strong foreign greenfield presence. Ho-
wever, the rapid development of banking systems in Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Po-
land and the Czech Republic has led other countries that embarked on banking reform at
the end of the decade to turn immediately to foreign investors (e.g. Bulgaria and Croatia).
Capital market development is complicated by the need to support the development of in-
stitutional infrastructure and regulatory mechanisms while at the same time avoid interfe-
ring in the markets. Challenges faced by policy makers include:
•  Policy makers should not expect immature markets and institutions to accomplish
unattainable goals. Privatization through vouchers is often predicated on the exis-
tence of well functioning equities markets. However, the privatization process was
often begun well before any trading mechanisms were in place.
•  Small open economies will be integrated into global capital markets so that foreign
penetration and ownership early on is desirable in these countries. Protectionist po-
licies in the Czech Republic and Poland have retarded the development of the ban-
king sectors and proved to be futile in the medium term.
•  Path dependency through synergies created by financial institutions indicates the
need for a clear, coherent goal for financial sector development to guide policy se-
quencing.
•  Sustainable growth depends on having a full enough continuum of financial institu-
tions. Successful new businesses need efficient sources of external financing to
support growth of the private sector; encouraging entry and then deserting the sur-
vivors is poor policy.John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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A decade into transition, the emerging financial sector architecture in the transition
economies has begun to become clear. Transition economies are bank-dominated and uni-
versal banking prevails. At the start of the transition process, observers argued whether
banking should follow a European, universal bank-dominant, model or an American model
in which capital markets dominate. However, the two paradigms have converged; Ameri-
can banks are now much less restricted and capital market developments are providing
enormous competitive pressures in Europe. The transitions economies are following this
path. Banks will have broad powers; they currently dominate financing activities. Unfor-
tunately most financing is lending to the government, non-bank financial institutions, or
short-term working capital for enterprises. However, capital markets and non-bank inter-
mediaries will be providing competition to the banking sector in the future.
Equity markets will be a part, albeit small, of the emerging architecture. Expectations
about the role of equity markets in the early transition years were often unrealistic. They
will play a small, but important, role as the most mature source of enterprise financing
following bond markets and informal capital market financing. The smaller transition
economies share a problem with all other small emerging markets in that capital markets
may never be sufficiently large to function well. Moreover, larger successful companies
will have no problem accessing international capital markets, which will further inhibit
local market development.
The biggest issue remaining in the transition economies is the role of the ‘missing pie-
ces.’  First, the near absence of institutional investors, the natural absorbers of capital mar-
ket instruments, slows capital development. The gradual maturing of the insurance industry
and the growth of pension funds will change this over time.  Second, the informal capital
markets that provide various kinds of short- and long-term investments need to develop.
This includes the use of trade credit and factoring intermediaries to provide an institutional
context for inter-firm short-term credit. Also, for longer term financing, the venture capital
and private placements industries must evolve. These less formal capital markets are even
overlooked in large economies because they are less visible than banks and stock markets.
However they are crucially important. These pieces are still missing in transition; venture
capital and takeovers are hardly observed.
In summary, the first decade of transition has witnessed remarkable progress in the
development of financial sector institutions. In many countries, active market-oriented fi-
nancial institutions function where there was only a state planning mechanism a decade
ago. For example, a description of the Hungarian financial sector in an IMF paper reads
more like that of a developed European economy than that of an emerging market
economy (see van Elkan, 1998). On the other hand, considerable effort at institutional rest-
ructuring in some transition economies has had little overall effect on economies in which
market orientations are weak (see OECD, November 1998). Nevertheless, it is important to
remember that even the most-developed institutions, i.e., banks and equity markets, do not
always function as well as they should and that the broad array of other financial institu-
tions and instruments that fill out the intermediation process are largely still missing.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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Appendix tables
Financial sector indicators for selected transition economies
8/*$5,$ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 41 40 41 42 28 34 34 35
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 0 1 3 3 7 17 22 25
State Owned Banks % of Assets 82.2 66.0 56.4 50.5 19.8
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 6.7 6.8 12.5 15.2 13.0 11.8 17.5 10.9
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 3.7 3.8 21.1 35.6 12.6  0- 14.6 12.2
Broad Money % of GDP 78.3 79.5 66.3 74.9 35.3 30.6 32.3 36.5
52$7,$ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 43 50 54 58 61 60 53 44
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 1 4 7  1 13 20
State Owned Banks % of Assets 58.9 55.5 51.9 36.2 32.6 37.5 39.6 5.7
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 12.2 12.9 11.2 8.2  0( 20.6 19.7
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 37.7 21.2 22.9 21.4 25.3 26.6 22.0
Broad Money % of GDP 25.8 20.2 25.0 34.0 41.0 > - 39.7 45.0
=(&+￿(38%/,& 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 50 55 55 53 50 45 42 40
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 12 13 13 14 15  5 17 16
State Owned Banks % of Assets   ! 17.9 17.6 16.6 17.5 18.6 23.1 28.2
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 36.0 26.6 21.8 19.9 01? 21.5 19.3
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 51.0 50.3 46.7 47.1 54.7 >"1 43.8
Broad Money % of GDP -1( 73.6 75.3 71.3 73.0 - 0 75.4 77.6
6721,$ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 21 22 18 15 12 6 7 7
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 1 1 4 3 3 2 2 4
State Owned Banks % of Assets 25.7 28.1 9.7 6.6 0.0 7.8 7.9 0.0
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 3.5 2.4 2.0 2.1 4.0 2.9 1.5
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 11.1 13.4 14.7 19.2 26.4 25.2 25.9 25.9
Broad Money % of GDP 32.8 33.5 32.9 34.6 40.4 35.5 42.7 49.2
81*$5< 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 40 43 42 41 41 40 39 38
N u m b e r  o f  F o r e i g n  O w n e d  B a n k s 1 51 72 12 53 02 72 73 0
State Owned Banks % of Assets 74.9 62.8 52.0 16.3 10.8 11.8 9.1 8.6
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 29.6 20.2 12.1 9.0 5.3 6.8 4.4 3.1
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 20.7 21.4 18.6 18.7 20.4 20.0 20.8 23.2
Broad Money % of GDP 56.8 52.2 48.7 48.6 47.3 45.8 46.2 46.3
$=$.+67$1 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 204 184 130 101 81 71 55 48
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 5 8 8 9 22 20 18 16
State Owned Banks % of Assets 24.3 28.4 44.8 23.0 19.9 1.9
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 14.9 19.9 6.0 >- 5.5 2.1
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 49.3 26.6 7.1 6.3 4.3 5.4 7.4 10.6
Broad Money % of GDP 0-! 13.1 11.4 9.5 10.3 "( 13.6 15.3John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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$79,$ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 62 56 42 35 32 27 23 21
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 11 14 15 15 12 12
State Owned Banks % of Assets 7.2 9.9 6.9 6.8 "5 2.6 2.9
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 11.0 19.0 20.0 10.0 (" 6.8 5.0
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 15.9 7.4 6.8 10.5  50 16.0 19.6
Broad Money % of GDP 31.5 33.4 22.3 22.2 26.6 25.7 25.6 29.4
,7+8$1,$ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 26 22 15 12 12  0 13 13
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 0 0 0 3 4 5 4 6
State Owned Banks % of Assets 53.6 48.0 61.8 54.0 48.8 44.4 41.9 38.9
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 27.0 17.3 32.2 28.3 12.5 11.9 10.8
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 13.8 17.6 12.6 9.4 9.3 9.6 11.1 10.1
Broad Money % of GDP 23.1 25.8 23.3 17.2 19.0 19.4 21.1 23.3
	2/$1’ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 87 82 81 81 83 83 77 74
N u m b e r  o f  F o r e i g n  O w n e d  B a n k s 1 01 11 82 52 93 13 94 7
State Owned Banks % of Assets 86.2 80.4 71.7 69.8 51.6 48.0 24.9 24.0
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 36.4 34.0 23.9 14.7 11.5 11.8 14.5 15.9
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 12.2 12.0 12.7 15.9 17.1  -( 18.8 18.8
Broad Money % of GDP 35.9 36.7 36.1 37.2 39.6 40.2 43.1 42.0
20$1,$ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 20 24 31 33 36 34 33
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 3 6 8 13 16 19 21
State Owned Banks % of Assets 80.4 84.3 80.9 80.0 75.3 50.3 50.0
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 18.5 37.9 48.0 56.5 5"5 35.4 3.8
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 11.5 8.4   ( 8.2 7.2
Broad Money % of GDP 22.3 21.4 25.3 27.9 24.8 27.5 25.7 22.0
866,$ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 2009 2456 2297 2029 1697 1476 1349 1311
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 21 22 26 ?1 32 33
State Owned Banks % of Assets 37.0 41.9
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 12.3 13.4 12.1 ?1! 25.8 15.3
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 11.8 12.1 8.5 7.4 9.4 12.8 11.5
Broad Money % of GDP 19.0 16.0 13.9 13.4 14.8  !5 17.4 18.5

/29$.￿(38%/,& 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 28 29 33 29 29 27 25 23
N u m b e r  o f  F o r e i g n  O w n e d  B a n k s 1 31 41 81 41 31 11 01 3
State Owned Banks % of Assets 70.7 66.9 61.2 54.2 48.7 50.0 50.7 49.1
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 12.2 30.3 41.3 31.8 33.4 44.3 32.9 26.2
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 30.4 23.0 26.3 30.4 42.1 43.9 40.5 37.6
Broad Money % of GDP 63.9 64.3 65.4 68.7 66.2 62.1 64.6 58.9

/29(1,$ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 45 44 39 36 34 ?1 31 28
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 5 6 6 4 4 3 51 61
State Owned Banks % of Assets 47.8 39.8 41.7 40.7 40.1 41.3 41.7 42.2
Bad Loans % of Total Loans  ?" 9.3 10.1 10.0 !5 8.6 8.5
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 22.1 23.1 27.5 28.8 28.6 32.8 35.8
Broad Money % of GDP ?5- 39.7 42.4 44.4 48.5 51.9 52.6 54.7Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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.5$,1( 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks 211 228 230 229 227 175 161 154
Number of Foreign Owned Banks 1 1 6 12 12 15 14
State Owned Banks % of Assets 13.5 13.7 12.5 11.9
Bad Loans % of Total Loans 34.6 34.2 32.5
Credit to Private Sector % of GDP 1.4 4.6 1.5 1.4 2.5 7.8 8.6
Broad Money % of GDP 33.6 26.5 12.7 11.5 13.4 15.3 17.6 17.0

EBRD Transition Report, 2001

1) Data for 2000 are estimates.
2) Broad money as % of GDP is updated by the data from EBRD Transition Report Update April 2001John Bonin and Paul Wachtel Financial sector development in transition economies:
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Equity markets in selected transition economies
8/*$5,$ 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Listed companies 16 26 15 15 998 828 503
Market Capitalization (million $) 61.4 7.3 2.2 992 706 617
Trading Value (million $) 4.4 0 0 11.6 53.5 57.7
Turnover Ratio 0.1 0 2.3 6 9.2
GDP 10944 10374 10833 9781 13106 9830 10056 12258 12403
Market Capitalization per company 2.4 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.9 1.2
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 0.5 0.1 0.0 8.1 5.7
52$7,$ 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Listed companies 29 61 66 77 50 59 64
Market Capitalization (million $) 514 581 2975 4246 3190 2584 2742
Trading Value (million $) 251.8 46.8 227 343.3 103 75 188
Turnover Ratio 104.4 8.2 12.6 9.7 2.8 2.7 7.4
GDP 13370 10241 10903 14583 18811 19886 20294 21752 20426
Market Capitalization per company 17.7 9.5 45.1 55.1 63.8 43.8 42.8
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 3.5 3.1 15.0 20.9 14.7 12.7
=(&+￿(38%/,& 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Listed companies 1024 1635 1588 276 261 164 131
Market Capitalization (million $) 5938 15664 18077 12786 12045 11796 11002
Trading Value (million $) 1328 3630 8431 7071 4807 4120 6582
Turnover Ratio 32.9 50.3 47.9 38 36.7 60.3
GDP 25572 29805 34998 41087 52037 57922 53000 56379 53111
Market Capitalization per company 5.8 9.6 11.4 46.3 46.1 71.9 84.0
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 14.5 30.1 31.2 24.1 21.4 22.2
6721,$ 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Listed companies 22 26 25 23
Market Capitalization (million $) 1101 519 1789 1846
Trading Value (million $) 1484 922 285 326
Turnover Ratio 116.1 24.1 18.9
GDP 6020 4226 3922 3945 4789 4358 4765 5202 5233
Market Capitalization per company 50.0 20.0 71.6 80.3
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 23.1 10.0 34.2
81*$5< 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
N u m b e r  o f  L i s t e d  c o m p a n i e s 2 1 2 3 2 84 04 24 54 95 56 66 0
Market Capitalization (million $) 505 562 812 1604 2399 5273 14975 14028 16317 12021
Trading Value (million $) 117 38 99 270 355 1641 7472 16042 14395 12150
Turnover Ratio 6.3 14.2 21.6 17.3 41.6 73.4 113.9 95.8 90.7
GDP 33429 37255 38596 41506 44669 45162 45723 47807 48436
Market Capitalization per company 24.0 24.4 29.0 40.1 57.1 117.2 305.6 255.1 247.2 200.4
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 1.5 1.5 2.1 3.9 5.4 11.7 32.8 29.3 33.7
$79,$ 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Listed companies 17 34 51 69 70 64
Market Capitalization (million $) 10 151 338 382 391 563
Trading Value (million $) 11.9 84.2 85 45 228
Turnover Ratio 14.6 34.6 24.2 11.9 48.6
GDP 4904 5135 5638 6396 6260
Market Capitalization per company 0.6 4.4 6.6 5.5 5.6 8.8
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 0.2 2.9 6.0 6.0 6.2Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2002
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	2/$1’ 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Listed companies 9 16 22 44 65 83 143 198 221 225
Market Capitalization (million $) 144 222 2706 3057 4564 8390 12135 20461 29577 31279
Trading Value (million $) 28 167 2170 5134 2770 5538 7951 8918 11149 14631
Turnover Ratio 89.7 129.1 176.7 71.5 84.8 78.4 54.4 45.8 49.9
GDP 80674 89412 91588 98534 126318 142965 143132 158102 155166
Market Capitalization per company 16.0 13.9 123.0 69.5 70.2 101.1 84.9 103.3 133.8 139.0
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 0.2 0.2 3.0 3.1 3.6 5.9 8.5 12.9 19.1
866,$ 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Listed companies 13 26 51 72 170 73 208 237 207 249
Market Capitalization (million $) 244 218 18 151 15863 37230 128207 20598 72205 38922
Trading Value (million $) 91 118 268 465 2958 16229 10495 2839 20312
Turnover Ratio 31.1 196 234.8 2.6 10.8 19.4 11.3 5.9 36.9
GDP 542104 441988 393449 325918 357903 419000 435953 276611 401442
Market Capitalization per company 18.8 8.4 0.4 2.1 93.3 510.0 616.4 86.9 348.8 156.3
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 8.9 29.4 7.4 18.0

/29$.,$ 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Listed companies 18 18 816 872 837 845 838
Market Capitalization (million $) 1093 1235 2182 1826 965 723 742
Trading Value (million $) 120 832 2321 2165 1032 474 896
Turnover Ratio 69.9 134 109.4 73.7 59.7 129.7
GDP 10845 11757 11996 17393 18781 19452 20363 19712
Market Capitalization per company 60.7 68.6 2.7 2.1 1.2 0.9 0.9
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 9.1 7.1 11.6 9.4 4.7 3.7

/29(1,$ 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
N u m b e r  o f  L i s t e d  c o m p a n i e s 1 62 51 72 12 62 82 83 8
Market Capitalization (million $) 594.6 514.8 663.2 1624.7 2450 2180 2547
Trading Value (million $) 344.6 401.3 351.9 702 733 465
Turnover Ratio 57.6 68.8 30.8 34.9 32.4 20.7
GDP 12673 12523 12673 14386 18743 18878 18206 19524 20011
Market Capitalization per company 23.8 30.3 31.6 62.5 87.5 77.9 67.0
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 4.1 2.7 3.5 8.9 12.5 10.9
.5$,1( 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Listed companies 125 125 139
Market Capitalization (million $) 3666.8 570 1121 1881
Trading Value (million $) 93 124 288
Turnover Ratio 4.7 14.8 19.6
GDP 81369 91505 71285 52292 49061 62761 53460 43615 38653
Market Capitalization per company 4.6 9.0 13.5
Market Capitalization as % of GDP 6.9 1.3 2.9
Source: S&P Emerging Stock Market Factbook, 2001 and IFC, Emerging Equity Market Factbook, 1998.BOFIT Discussion Papers
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